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INTRODUCTION
Susan Love andHelen Cooksey
JoyfullyAnnounce the Birth of Their
Daughter
Katherine Mary Love-Cookey
"Katie"
April 30, 1988
Eight Pounds, 2 Ounces
21 Inches
Boston, Mass.1
The year after Katie's birth I used this announcement of her arrival to
frame an article about the lack of legal protections for families consisting of
lesbian couples and their children.2 Twenty years later, in this article, I consider
briefly how the law has developed for families like Katie's and then present the
additional reforms necessary to ensure the economic and emotional security
that all children born to lesbian couples deserve.
In 1989, families like Katie's were little known in culture or law. No
appellate court had ruled on the ability of a mother's same-sex partner to adopt
the child they planned for together. No appellate court had ruled on a
nonbiological mother's claim that she should be allowed to raise the child if the
biological mother died, or have rights to custody and visitation with the child if
the two mothers separated.
Lesbian mothers had been in the courts for well over a decade, but in cases
arising after their heterosexual marriages ended. In those cases, they argued
that their ex-husbands should not be able to deny them custody of their children
based on their sexual orientation. 3 Those cases raised the first generation of
lesbian mother legal issues. Early scholarship urged a legal standard requiring
proof of harm to a child before a mother's lesbianism could result in a loss of
custody.4 Scholars and lawyers debunked pervasive myths about gay and
1. GAY COMMUNITY NEws (Boston), June 19-25, 1988, at 3, col. 4, reprinted in Nancy
D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs
of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 461
(1990) [hereinafter Polikoff, This Child Does Ha ve Two Mothers].
2. Polikoff, This Child Does Ha ve Two Mothers, supra note 1, at 461.
3. See, e.g., O'Harra v. O'Harra, No. 73-384 E (Or. Cir. Ct., June 18, 1974), aff'd, 530
P.2d 877 (Or. Ct. App. 1975); Townend v. Townend, 1 Fain. L. Rep. 2830 (Ohio Ct. Corn.
Pl. 1975).
4. See Nan D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights ofLesbian Mothers: Legal
Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BUFF. L. REv. 691, 693 (1976); Rhonda R. Rivera, Our
Straight-Laced Judges. The Legal Position ofHomosexual Persons in the United States, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 799, 888 (1978); Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How the Law Fails
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lesbian parents and urged rulings grounded in which parent could best meet a
child's needs rather than in assumptions of the harm caused by living with a
gay or lesbian parent.5
By the time Katie was born, however, lesbian couples in many parts of the
country had begun having children using assisted conception or adoption. The
phenomenon was new enough that I spent the first two sections of my article
6documenting and describing such families. I also documented the handful of
trial courts that had granted second-parent adoptions, all in Alaska, California,
and Washington, and described several pending cases in which the couple had
separated and the nonbiological mother was challenging the biological
mother's refusal to permit her any contact with their child.7
In the article, I argued that existing adoption statutes should be interpreted
to permit adoption by a mother's same-sex partner, and I articulated a number
of theories that would support continuation of the relationship between a child
and the nonbiological parent if the couple's relationship ended. 8 In the ensuing
years, second-parent adoption has become available in several states, but
remains impossible in others; in some states, such adoptions have been granted
by particular trial judges but never tested on appeal. 9 In numerous cases where
there has been no second-parent adoption, lawyers have urged courts to
recognize intended, functional parental relationships and to reject narrow
definitions of parentage dependent upon biology, heterosexual marriage, or
Lesbian and GayParents and Their Children, 71 IND. L.J. 623, 643 (1996).
5. More recent scholarship articulates the proper test differently, urging a rule that a
parent's sexual orientation is irrelevant to a custody determination. See Michael S. Wald,
Adults' Sexual Orientation and State Determinations Regarding Placement of Children, 40
FAm. L.Q. 381, 386 (2006). Additionally, the American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution prohibit a court from considering the sexual orientation of a
parent, except upon a showing that such conduct causes harm to the child. See ALI
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.12(1)(d) (ALI 2002).
6. Polikoff, This Child Does Ha ve Two Mothers, supra note 1, at 459-68.
7. Id. at 522-25, 533-42. I also described three cases in which the biological mother
had died and her relatives were litigating against the nonbiological mother for custody of the
child. Id. at 527-34.
8. Id. at 483-522.
9. See FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL, STATE-BY-STATE: SECOND PARENT ADOPTION
LAWS (2008), http://www.familyequality.org/resources/publications/secondparent
withcitations.pdf. There is a technical distinction between joint and second-parent adoption.
The term "joint adoption" generally refers to a couple adopting together a child who is not
the child of either of them. The term "second-parent adoption" generally refers to the partner
of a parent (either biological or adoptive) adopting that parent's child without terminating
the parental rights of the partner who is already a parent. Some courts interpret their adoption
statutes to require joint adoption, even when one partner is already a parent. See In re
Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993) (reading the "termination
provision" in the Massachusetts adoption statute as inapplicable when the natural parent and
her partner jointly file the adoption petition). For purposes of this article, I use the term
"second-parent adoption" whenever one partner is already a child's parent, even if the legal
theory that permits both of them to become the child's legal parents is joint adoption.
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adoption. 10 Over the past twenty years, they have met with mixed success. 11
Katie Love-Cooksey's infancy and youth corresponded with the earliest
years of these second-generation lesbian mother legal issues. Katie herself
played a feature role in the development of the law. In 1993, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court ruled that Susan, Katie's biological mother, and Helen,
her nonbiological mother, could file a joint adoption petition that would enable
Helen to become Katie's legal parent. 12 It was the first such ruling in
Massachusetts and only the second appellate opinion approving second-parent
adoption in the country.
13
Second-parent adoption has proved a powerful legal device for gay and
lesbian families. It is modeled on step-parent adoption, a statutory scheme that
allows a biological (or adoptive) parent's spouse to adopt a child without
terminating that parent's rights, thereby leaving the child with two parents.
However critical this method of securing the family's legal protection
remains-and will remain for the foreseeable future-there is a conceptual flaw
in analogizing same-sex couples to a step-family.
A step-family forms after a child already exists. The child lives with one
10. Two of the earliest cases showing the obstacles facing legally unrecognized
mothers were Alison D. v Virginia M, 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991), and NancyS v. M/cele
G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ca. Ct. App. 1991). Among the earliest successful cases drawing
upon these theories were VC. v MJ.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000), and In re HS.H.-K, 533
N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995). Another set of issues arose involving disputes over the legal status
of a known semen donor. See, e.g., Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1994); Leckie v. Voorhies, 875 P.2d 521 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
11. For a review of cases going both ways, see NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN
RIGT-rrs, STATE BY STATE LIST OF SAMW-SEx CUSTODY CASES, available at
http://www.nclrights.org/site/PageServerpagename=issue families docsDownloads. First-
generation lesbian mother legal issues have not disappeared. Women still come out as
lesbians after they have married and had children. In parts of the country, they still face
discrimination if their ex-husbands seek to restrict their contact with their children. See, e.g.,
Bums v. Bums, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (awarding custody of Susan Bums's
three children to her ex-husband and stating that the children could not visit her if at any
time during their stay she was living with or spending overnights with a person to whom she
was not legally married).
12. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993). Although Susan and
Helen's first names are used in the court's opinion, Katie's name is changed to Tammy, in
keeping with the general practice of redacting names in adoption rulings, a custom designed
to preserve the child's privacy. Because Katie herself has spoken publicly about her family
and the court ruling that allowed Helen to adopt her, I identify her here. See Guianna
Henriquez, A Teen with Two Moms, LA YOUTH, Mar.-Apr. 2005, available at
http://www.layouth.com/modules.phpop=modload&name=Jssue&action=IssueArticle&aid
=950&nid=58.
13. The first was In re Adoptions ofBL. VB. & EL VB., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993)
(granting second-parent adoption). The first trial court ruling reported in any legal
publication was an opinion from the District of Columbia. In re Petitions of L.S. and V.L.,
17 Fam. L. Rep (BNA) 1523 (1991). But see In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis.
1994) (holding second-parent adoption impermissible under Wisconsin's adoption statute).
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parent. That person marries or remarries. If the child has no second parent, the
step-parent adoption is relatively simple. If there is a second parent, that person
must consent to a termination of his parental rights, or the termination must be
obtained through a judicial proceeding, and only then can the adoption take
place.
A lesbian couple, on the other hand, plans for a child together. From before
birth, the child-to-be has two parents. The nonbiological mother is not a step-
parent. The closest analogy to her situation is that of an infertile husband whose
wife, with his consent, conceives using donor semen. That husband does not
have to adopt his child.
Thus, there is now a third generation of lesbian mother legal issues, raised
by the question that nonbiological lesbian mothers often ask: "Why should I
have to adopt my own child?" In this article I describe what statutes would
need to be in place for that mother to be a legal parent-to-be from the moment
of conception and a legal parent from the moment of birth. No adoption
necessary.
In Part I of this article, I briefly describe the historical relationship between
marriage, biology, and legal parenthood. I do this to imbue the project I
undertake here with a sense of ordinariness. The effort to determine when and
how a lesbian couple becomes the legal parents of a child born to one of them
is not an effort to fit the square peg of two mothers into the round hole of the
"natural" way of becoming a parent, because there is not, and never has been, a
"natural" way of becoming a legal parent.
In Part II, I turn specifically to lesbian couples. I describe existing
American statutes under which a lesbian partner of a biological mother is the
legal parent of their child. These fall into two groups: statutes extending the
legal consequences of marriage to same-sex couples who marry or enter civil
unions or domestic partnerships; and general parentage statutes, enacted
without contemplating lesbian couples, that courts have applied to find the
partner of a biological mother a parent. Neither of these frameworks addresses
all the issues necessary to a comprehensive approach to parentage
determinations in these families. Even a recent Delaware statute, which was
written with same-sex couples in mind, falls short because it likely requires a
court determination that the partner of the biological mother is a parent.
From there, I describe what a statutory scheme might encompass if written
with lesbian couples specifically in mind. In Part III, I explain statutory reforms
in Quebec and other Canadian provinces, in Australia, and in a number of
European countries that specifically establish parentage for both mothers when
a child is born using assisted conception.
In Part IV, I present the complete package of law reform necessary to
protect children of lesbian couples. Those reforms should include a gender-
neutral and marital status-neutral provision creating parentage for the partner of
a woman who conceives using donor insemination; a presumption of parentage
based on a couple's marriage, civil union or domestic partnership; the basis for
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rebutting that presumption; and instructions for proper registration of parentage
on a child's birth certificate.
The recently enacted District of Columbia Domestic Partnership Judicial
Determination of Parentage Act of 2009 contains provisions that can serve as a
model for other jurisdictions. 14 This legislation borrowed heavily from recent
model statutes that contemplate two mothers for a child born of assisted
conception.
With these statutes in place, the child of a lesbian couple begins life with
two legally recognized parents. In Part V, I address the possibility that, if the
family moves, a different state might try to deprive that child of one of her
parents. Litigation surrounding any such effort will be part of this third
generation of lesbian mother legal issues.
Katie Love-Cooksey had two parents, whose last names she shared, from
the moment she was born. Until Helen's adoption petition was granted when
Katie was 5, however, Katie and Helen were legal strangers. Even where
second-parent adoption is available today, the couple must hire a lawyer and
participate in what can be both a lengthy and expensive legal process. Until a
judge signs the adoption decree, the nonbiological mother and her child are
legal strangers. For families unfamiliar with these procedures, without the
resources to pursue them, or without full comprehension of the ramifications of
failure to do so, the nonbiological mother and her child remain legal strangers.
To a child, in daily life, the absence of an adoption decree makes no
difference. In the hearing about Katie's adoption, numerous witnesses testified
that she had always related to both Susan and Helen as her parents. 15 The legal
status becomes crucial, however, when the child's economic and emotional
security are challenged. Then many rights-such as support and custody, public
benefits and inheritance-turn not on the child's perception but on the
existence of a legally recognized parent-child relationship. 16 For the law to
catch up to families like Katie's, it needs to acknowledge that children of
lesbian couples have two mothers from the beginning and that no legal
proceeding is necessary to establish that fact.
I. TE REVOLUTION IN LEGAL PARENTAGE HAS ALREADY OCCURRED
Legal parentage has always been a matter of law. I state something that
sounds so obvious because it is easy to forget. We have testing that can
determine genetic parenthood to a virtual certainty. It may seem a small step
14. DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PARENTAGE ACT OF 2009,
D.C. A18-0084 (D.C. 2009), 56 D.C. Reg. 4269 (June 5, 2009), available at
http://www.dccouncil.us/images/00001/20090511122621.pdf. The law went into effect July
18, 2009, as D.C. Law 18-33. See 56 D.C. Reg. 6135 (Aug. 7, 2009).
15. In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Mass. 1993).
16. Id. at 321.
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from that to an instinctive notion that a child's "real" parents are those
individuals whose genetic material produced that child. Many laws retain the
term "natural parent," which sounds like it must be a reference to biology. 
17
The historical relationship between biology and legal parenthood, however,
is more complex. This Part describes that history, highlighting the most
revolutionary development in family law in the last half of the twentieth
century: the end of the legal distinction between children born to married
women and those born to unmarried women. Although that development
increased the legal significance of a biological connection to a child, biology
has not become the singular determinant of legal parentage.
A. Parentage Without Marriage: The End of the Stigmatized Legal Status of
"Illegitimacy"
For most of our history, not just in America but in the common law
tradition from which we get our laws, a child's legal parents were the mother
who gave birth to that child and the man to whom she was married. 18 As a
matter of law, that man's biological connection to the child was irrelevant. If
the child's mother was unmarried, then the child had no legal father. Again, a
man's biological connection to the child was irrelevant. While biology looms
large today in colloquial discussions of who a child's parents are, 19 the law had
little interest in that question until the last half-century.
It is true that only recently has science provided the tools to ascertain
biological parenthood to a virtual certainty, but that does not account for all of
the law's past indifference to biology as a determinant of parenthood. A man
"openly and notoriously" cohabiting with a woman, holding himself out as the
father of her child for all the community to see, was not a legal parent unless he
was married to the child's mother.20 Until modem times, it was a man's
relationship to a child's mother, not his biological relationship to the child, that
determined his legal status.
17. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7601 (1994) (defining "parent-child relationship" as
the legal relationship existing between a child and the child's natural or adoptive parents).
18. See, e.g., Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, DNA-Based Identity Testing and
the Future of the Family: A Research Agenda, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 215, 222 (2002)
(discussing the development of the English "marital presumption," and noting that "[i]f a
husband, not physically incapable, was within the four seas of England during the period of
gestation, the court would not listen to evidence casting doubt on his paternity").
19. There is no greater illustration of this than the massive amount of media
speculation after Michael Jackson's death about who was the "father" of his children. See,
e.g., LarryKing Live (CNN television broadcast July 8, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/video/#/
video/showbiz/2009/07/08/sot.klein.mj.dr.cnn?ireftvideosearch (showing CNN's Larry
King asking Dr. Arnold Klein if he was the father of the Jackson children).
20. See e.g., In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814 (Ill. 1970). Though later overturned by the
United States Supreme Court, see infra note 31, In re Stanley illustrates the role of marriage
in determining legal paternity.
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No change I propose here to the American law of parentage could have
nearly as much revolutionary impact as the end of the legal distinction between
children born to married women and those born to unmarried women.
Discrimination against children born outside marriage and their mothers was
the primary method of enforcing the prohibition on nonmarital sex. Although
sex outside marriage was largely unlawful, criminal prosecution was
uncommon. What was common was the social stigma and legal disadvantage
attached to nonmarital birth.
21
A revolution in sexual mores was among the cultural changes that
accompanied the social and political movements of the 1960s. The birth control
pill was introduced in 1960, providing women for the first time with a reliable
means of being sexually active and avoiding pregnancy. "Make love, not war"
was the refrain of a generation. Although a sexual "double standard" lingered
between women and men, this was decried by a robust second-wave feminist
movement. Researchers William Masters and Virginia Johnson conducted
groundbreaking studies of sexuality.22 They identified women's sources of
sexual satisfaction and demonstrated, among other things, that women could
achieve sexual fulfillment without men.23 As hostility to nonmarital sex
decreased, legal doctrine reflecting condemnation of such sex became less
defensible.
Some distinctions between children born to a married mother and those
born to an unmarried mother abated over time, but those remaining were out of
step with the social and political changes of the 1960s. In 1966, Illinois law
professor Harry Krause published an article voicing the idea, radical at its time,
that U.S. law should further reduce this distinction. Krause argued that the
21. For centuries such children had been iius nullius, the child of no one, meaning
they had no legally recognized relationship with, including no right to support from, their
mother or father. HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 25-28 (1971).
There were once places where a "bastard" could not hold public office or testify in court,
could be denied burial, and could be murdered with only minimal criminal consequences.
Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REv. 477 (1967). Until
the 1960s, pregnancy and childbirth were hard-to-avoid consequences of sex; abortion was
illegal and effective contraception was either illegal or difficult to obtain. Teenage
pregnancy rates peaked in the 1950s, but births outside marriage were relatively rare, due to
"shotgun weddings" pressed by the woman's family. Of those who did not marry, over
25,000 a year went to more than 200 "unwed-mother" homes where they gave birth secretly
and almost always surrendered their children for adoption. Women who kept their children,
including the black women who were excluded from most of the unwed-mother homes,
faced harsh state policies, including denial of public assistance and eviction from public
housing. Doctors sometimes sterilized them without their knowledge or consent. Their
children's birth certificates were sometimes stamped "bastard." See generally ANN FESSLER,
THE GIRLs WHO WENT AWAY (2006); RicMiE SOLINGER, WAKE Up LITTLE SUSIE (1992).
22. See WILLIAM MASTERS & VIRGINIA JOHNSON, HUMAN SEXUAL RESPONSE (1966);
WILLIAM MASTERS & VIRGINIA JOHNSON, HUMAN SEXUAL INADEQUACY (1970). See also
JOHN D'EMlio & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN
AMERICA 312 (1988).
23. MASTERS & JOHNSON, HUMAN SEXUAL RESPONSE, supra note 22, at 133-34.
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second-class status of nonmarital children came from "ancient prejudice based
on religious and moral taboos that properly are losing their taboo status."
' 24
Krause took his ideas to the U.S. Supreme Court, where children and
parents harmed by the different status given marital and nonmarital children
invoked the Equal Protection Clause to argue that the distinctions were
unconstitutional. In 1968, in Levy v. Louisiana, surviving nonmarital children
challenged a Louisiana statute that denied them the ability to recover for the
wrongful death of their mother.25 The state court upheld the statute because
"based on morals and general welfare" it discouraged "bringing children into
the world out of wedlock.,
26
Louisiana defended its laws by arguing that it was not trying to punish or
discriminate. Rather, the law was trying to encourage marriage. The state's
brief read:
Louisiana's purposes ... are positive ones: the encouragement of marriage as
one of the most important institutions known to law, the preservation of the
legitimate family as the preferred environment for socializing the child ....
Since marriage as an institution is fundamental to our existence as a free
nation, it is the duty of... Louisiana to encourage it. One method of
encouraging marriage is granting greater rights to legitimate offspring than
those born of extra-marital unions. Superior rights of legitimate offspring are
inducements or incentives to parties to contract marriage, which is preferred• • • 27
by Louisiana as the setting for producing offspring.
The Supreme Court rejected such reasoning. In a companion case, the
Court struck down a statute denying a mother the right to recover for the
28wrongful death of her nonmarital child. Illegitimate children were human
beings, "persons" within the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. In the
Levycase, they had been dependent on their mother, who had died as a result of
medical malpractice. The Court refused to allow the wrongdoers to escape
responsibility for their negligence simply because the children were born
outside of marriage. 29 Encouraging marriage and expressing disapproval of
nonmarital sex were no longer constitutionally sufficient reasons to deny rights
to children and their parents.
In 1972, the Court found unconstitutional a state scheme that awarded
worker's compensation death benefits to a father's four legitimate children but
not his two "illegitimate" ones, even though he lived in one household with all
24. Harry D. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society A Proposed Uniform
Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEx. L. REv. 829, 830 (1966).
25. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
26. Levy v. State, 192 So.2d 193, 195 (La. App. 1966).
27. Brief for the Attorney General, State of Louisiana as Amicus Curiae, Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
28. Levy, 391 U.S. at 72; Glona v. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
29. Levy, 391 U.S. at 72.
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of them. That same year, the Supreme Court further reduced the legal
significance of marriage.
In Stanley v. Illinois, Peter Stanley challenged an Illinois law that
automatically made his children wards of the state when their mother died.31 If
Peter Stanley and the mother of his children had been married, the state would
not have stepped in to take custody. The Court ruled that the state could not
presume Stanley unfit simply because he was never married to the children's
mother.32 Stanley had a constitutional right to raise his children; marriage was
irrelevant. In so ruling, the Court overturned centuries of law that created a
father-child relationship only for a man married to a child's mother.
By the time of Stanley, the sexual revolution was well underway. The rule
disregarding Stanley as the parent of his nonmarital children was consistent
with established law, but it was clearly not good for the children. If the state
had removed the children from their home after their mother died, it would
have deprived them of their sole remaining parent. The Court dispensed with
centuries of law to avoid an unwise result.
The outcome of Stanley v Illinois may seem obvious today-how could it
possibly be in children's best interests to lose their father after they had lost
their mother? But it was extraordinary in 1972. The decision required every
state to revise its laws. That is as close as it gets to a legal revolution. The next
year, the Court ruled that children's right to support payments from their father
could not turn on whether their father had been married to their mother. 
33
Harry Krause also influenced the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) to address the issue of nonmarital children.
His work led to the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), written between 1969 and
1972. 34 It was adopted in some form in nineteen states, and it greatly
influenced new laws in every state. 35 In less than a decade, the legal doctrine of
30. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). By now Associate Justice
(and future Chief Justice) William Rehnquist had joined the Court. He alone dissented,
accepting the state's interest in discouraging "illicit family relationships." Id. at 177
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
31. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
32. Id. at 658.
33. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
34. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) [hereinafter UPA].
35. See Prefatory Note, UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2002) ("As of December, 2000, UPA
(1973) was in effect in 19 states stretching from Delaware to California; in addition, many
other states have enacted significant portions of it.") The influence of Harry Krause and the
relevance of his analysis for the parentage of children born to same-sex couples is discussed
in Mary Patricia Byrn, From Right to Wrong: A Critique of the 2000 Uniform Parentage Ac4
16 UCLA WOMEN'S L. J. 163, 208-09, 214-20 (2007). There is reason to believe that Harry
Krause would approve of reforms that recognize the parentage rights of same-sex couples.
Writing on the occasion of the 16th International Congress of Comparative Law, he said,
"rational law should differentiate between intimate associations on the basis of actual
differences in social functions that are or can be fulfilled by particular unions. In those
rational terms, far fewer differences appear between heterosexual and same-sex couples, and
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"illegitimacy" had all but disappeared. Except when conception occurred with
assisted reproductive technology, marriage no longer divided the country's
children into two classes, the privileged one whose parents were married and
the subordinate one whose parents were not.
B. Parentage Without Biological Connection
The end of "illegitimacy" opened the door to the modem era of parentage
issues. Lesbians, gay men, and single heterosexual women proudly form
families that would have been both legally and socially unthinkable in an
earlier era. No one-even the most ardent opponents of parenting by same-sex
couples- wants to reinstate the second-class legal status historically imposed
on all children bom to unmarried women. But once marriage does not
determine parental rights and responsibilities, the law must decide what does.
Importantly, the role once played by marriage has not been replaced by
biology, even in the face of the ability to determine biological connection to a
36
virtual certainty. A simple fact proves this point. We do not do genetic testing
of every child born to a married woman to determine if that child is the
biological child of her husband, although it would be easy to do so. Instead, we
name the husband the legal parent of her child, based solely upon their
marriage. 
37
The number of children born to a mother and a nonbiological father is not
far greater differences appear between child-rearing and childless couples, than many
traditionalists see." Harry D. Krause & David D. Meyer, What Family for the 21st Century?,
50 AM. J. COMP. L. 101, 111 (2002).
36. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 HARv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 323, 326-27 (2004) ("The dominant trend in law today is in the direction of
reducing the importance of biology as a factor in defining parentage. Increasing emphasis is
being placed on established and intended parenting relationships, with these factors
sometimes weighing equally with or even outweighing biology."). See also Deborah H.
Wald, The Parentage Puzzle: The Interplay Between Genetics, Procreative Inten4 and
Parental Conduct in Determining Legal Parentage, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L.
379, 381 (2007) (explaining that courts are now looking to intent and conduct as much as to
marriage and biology in creating legal parent-child relationships).
37. Some scholars have pointed out that the information obtained from such testing
would eliminate an entire category of litigation that now plagues family courts. No longer
would men later seek disestablishment of paternity to terminate their child support
obligations. Nor would a mother be able to disestablish a father's parentage should she later
desire that result. Such litigation is troublesome for children, who face an upheaval in their
understanding of their family. It has produced widely disparate court decisions around the
country. Biological certainty at birth would facilitate a definitive determination of legal
parentage that would remain constant throughout the child's life. See June Carbone & Naomi
Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Genetic
Certainty 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1012 (2003) (suggesting that "[i]n an era
when children are likely to discover the truth of their biological origins whether all of the
concerned adults wish it or not, testing for biological certainty ought to be made a routine
part of the birth process").
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trivial. Every year, tens of thousands of children are born to married mothers
who have conceived through sexual intercourse with men other than their
husbands. 38 Many thousands are born after insemination of the mother with
donor semen.39 Rather than assess biology at the child's birth and use that to
assign legal parentage, our laws facilitate the formation of legal parental
relationships within the context of adult relationships that are recognized by the
law.40 This method of assigning legal parentage is grounded in the expectation
that the two members of the legally cognizable adult relationship will raise the
child.
Beyond donor insemination of married women, there are numerous assisted
reproduction methods that result in legal parentage for genetically unrelated
individuals. For example, in Buzanca v Buzzanca, a California appeals court
named a married couple the legal parents of a child conceived using both donor
38. One analysis of numerous studies of nonpaternity estimates that when American
men have a high degree of certainty that they are the biological fathers of their children, a
group that includes married fathers, nonpaternity rates are about two percent. See Kermyt G.
Anderson, How Well Does Paternity Confidence Match Actual Paternity? Results fom
Worldwide Nonpaternity Rates, 47 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 513, 516 (2006); see also
Leslie Joan Harris, A New Paternity Law for the Twenty-First Century. Of Biology Social
Function, Children's Jnterests, and Betrayal, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 297 (2007). In 2005,
there were 4,138,349 births in the United States, 63.1 % of which were to married women,
for a total of 2,611,298. See National Center for Health Statistics, Births Natality
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/births.htm. When applied to 2005 births, the two-percent
estimate suggests that 52,226 children were born that year to married women who were not
the biological children of the mother's husband. A recent article, describing a genealogical
DNA project that uncovered many relatives whose genetic ancestors were not their identified
family members, reported a 2005 analysis of seventeen studies that averaged a nonpaternity
rate of four percent. See Alan Zarembo, DNA Reveals Secrets, Lies, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 18,
2009, at Al.
39. The country's largest sperm bank, California Cryobank, shipped 9600 vials of
sperm, each good for one insemination, to single women in 2005. This accounted for one
third of its business. Thus, it sent almost 20,000 vials to married women. Jennifer Egan,
Wanted A Few Good Spern N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 19, 2006, at 46. Lisa Mundy
writes that there are a total of 30,000 sperm donor babies a year. LISA MUNDY, EVERYTHING
CONCEIVABLE: How ASSISTED REPRODUCTION IS CHANGING MEN, WOMEN AND THE WORLD
12 (2007).
40. Law professor Lynn Wardle writes prolifically that lesbian and gay couples should
not raise children because children should be raised by their married, biological parents.
After his presentation at a symposium sponsored by the American University Journal of
Gender, Social Policy, & the Law, I asked Professor Wardle how he would rule if a married
woman bore a child who was the biological child of a man with whom she had had an affair,
and if the biological father, immediately after the child's birth, filed a paternity action, but
the mother and her husband wished to raise the child as their own. Although he thought such
a circumstance would occur rarely, he did choose the married couple as the child's parents,
to the exclusion of the biological father. Thus, when family life does not comport with the
ideal that Prof. Wardle professes, and a child will not be raised by her married, biological
parents, Prof. Wardle prefers that the law recognize the mother's husband, not the biological
father, as the child's legal parent. For a video of our exchange, see http://media.wcl.
american.edu/Mediasite/Viewer/?peid=8e6a9b7c-9521-44ad-8398-2075507b0391.
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sperm and donor eggs and born to a gestational surrogate. 4 Parentage turned
on the intent of all those involved in the reproductive effort. Professor Susan
Appleton, in an article rejecting biology as the necessary basis of parentage,
points out that, if legal parentage were dependent upon a genetic connection,
we would have to do genetic testing of a birth mother as well as her husband,
42
since the woman might have conceived using a donated egg.
Today, adoption is also a well-accepted means of becoming a parent in the
absence of biology. This was not always so. Adoption was unknown at
common law and therefore in the United States it required statutory
authorization. The first adoption statute was not enacted until 1851 in
Massachusetts. 43 Well into the twentieth century, adoption was a second-class
legal status that did not create a parent-child relationship for all purposes.44
Adoption still does not exist in all legal systems worldwide.
45
The question in the twenty-first century is not whether to recognize legal
parentage in the absence of biology but when to do so. This Article answers
that question for lesbian couples who choose to have a child together.46
41. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
42. Susan Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption ofLegitimacy in
the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 270-71 (2006) [hereinafter Appleton,
Presuming Women].
43. See Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1102-
05 (2003).
44. See Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption andAssociation: Who Should Get
What and Why, 37 VAND. L. REv. 711 (1984) (detailing the numerous ways in which
succession laws did not keep up with adoption as a fact of modem life).
45. See D. MARIANNE BLAIR & MERLE H. WEINER, FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY 867-68 (2003) (discussing kafala, a type of legal fostering present in Islamic
nations, and noting that although kafala requires fulfilling parental duties and caring for a
child "in the same way a father would do for his son," a child fostered through kafala may
not use the name of the fostering family or inherit from them).
46. I deliberately limit this Article to lesbian couples. Gay male couples have children
together, and the law needs to address parentage for them as well. In part, I limit this Article
because surrogacy is unlawful in the District of Columbia. See D.C. CODE § § 16-401 to -402,
(2001). Those of us involved in drafting the legislation discussed in this article decided that
revisiting the surrogacy ban would raise additional issues that were best left for separate
consideration. See Appleton, Presuming Women, supra note 42, at 260-90 (asserting that
because gestation must be viewed as performance of a parenting function, parental
presumptions for gay male couples employing surrogacy must be viewed differently from
parental presumptions for lesbian couples in which one partner gives birth). In the District of
Columbia, the partner of a man who has a biological child with the assistance of a surrogate
can be recognized as a de facto parent if he meets the statutory requirements for that status.
As a de facto parent under D.C. law, he would have the same right to custody and obligation
to pay child support as the child's biological father. See notes 182-83 ir#a and
accompanying text.
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II. LESBIAN COUPLES UNDER CURRENT AMERICAN LAW
At the moment, the lesbian partner of a woman who bears a child can
become a parent without adopting the child under two different statutory
schemes. The first derives from a formalized relationship between the two
women that provides the couple with all the state-based legal consequences of
marriage, including the marital parentage presumption. The second occurs
when a court determines that its existing statutes confer parentage on a
biological mother's partner.
Neither of these paths is entirely satisfactory. The first, even in the
minority of states in which it is available, leaves unanswered a number of
important questions about when and by whom the presumption can be rebutted.
It also leaves unprotected children born to couples who have not formalized
their status. The second path consists of a handful of cases, and a newly enacted
statute, that amount to the exceptions that prove the rule-that current law fails
to protect most lesbian couples and their children.
A. Presuming Parentage in a Formalized Couple Relationship
Ten states and the District of Columbia allow (or are set to allow) same-sex
couples to enter a formal legal status that grants the couple all or virtually all
the state-based legal consequences of marriage. Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Iowa, Vermont, and New Hampshire call this status marriage; the District of
Columbia, California, Oregon, Washington, and Nevada call it domestic
47partnership; New Jersey calls it civil union. In all instances, a female spouse
or domestic/civil union partner of a woman who bears a child receives the same
presumption of parentage that a husband receives. For example, Vermont law
reads that "the rights of parties to a civil union, with respect to a child of whom
either becomes the natural parent during the term of the civil union, shall be the
same as those of a married couple, with respect to a child of whom either
spouse becomes the natural parent during the marriage.
' 48
This should mean that a civil union partner of a woman who gives birth is
the child's presumptive parent, and Vermont does issue birth certificates with
both women listed as parents. But the one Vermont Supreme Court case on the
issue considered many facts other than the couple's civil union in determining
that the nonbiological mother was a parent.49 In a recent article in the Des
Moines Register, a spokesperson for the Iowa attorney general suggested that
the presumption of parentage does not attach to a married lesbian couple and
47. See Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality and Other Relationship
Recognition Laws (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.hrc.org/documents/Relationship_
Recognition Laws Map.pdf.
48. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(f) (2001). Civil unions existed in Vermont from July
1, 2000, until September 1, 2009, when same-sex couples became able to marry in Vermont.
49. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006).
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that the nonbiological mother would still have to adopt the child. 50 An Oregon
appeals court recently ruled that a female partner becomes a legal parent by
consenting to her partner's insemination, but in dicta it also indicated that the
presumption of parentage arising from a marriage exists only where there is the
possibility that the husband is the biological parent and that therefore it cannot
apply to a lesbian couple.
51
The presumption should attach based on the couple's status, and all
reasoning to the contrary is flawed.52 A husband gets the presumption
regardless of his biological connection to the child. The presumption can be
challenged by specified parties on specified grounds, but a husband does not
have to prove his fertility and a history of sexual intercourse with his wife to
show the possibility of biological connection-and thereby get the
presumption-in the first instance.
The primary goal of the law reform urged in this article is certainty and
stability of a child's relationship with both parents without requiring those
parents to spend the money or time necessary for a court proceeding. Parentage
based on presumption requires no court involvement; that is its strength. The
Social Security Administration, for example, considers a child born to a couple
in a Vermont civil union the child of both partners for the purpose of eligibility
53for child insurance benefits. This is because such a child inherits without a
will as the child of both partners under Vermont state law, and that satisfies the
definition of "child" under the relevant federal law. 4
But the lack of a court judgment-of adoption or parentage-also renders
presumptive parenthood deriving from the status of the couple vulnerable to
challenge in other jurisdictions. The full faith and credit that states are
mandated to afford judgments from the courts of other states does not extend to
55
the operation of statutes from those states. If the family relocates, the new
50. Jennifer Jacobs, Gay Marriage Law's Impact on Iowans Subtle, Yet Powerful, DES
MoINEs REG., June 14, 2009, at 1 (quoting Bob Brammer, spokesman for the Iowa attorney
general, saying that a woman's same-sex spouse will still have to adopt because the Iowa
Supreme Court's opinion does not authorize placing that spouse's name automatically on the
birth certificate). The gay rights group Lambda Legal disagrees with this interpretation and is
advocating a change in policy. E-mail from Camilla Taylor, Staff Attorney, Lambda Legal,
to author (July 16, 2009, 09:51) (on file with author).
51. Shineovich v. Kemp, 214 P.3d 29, 36 (Or. Ct. App. 2009), rev. denied, P.3d
(2009).
52. See Appleton, Presuming Women, supra note 42, at 252-55.
53. Steven A. Engel, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Memorandum Opinion, Whether the Defense ofMarriage Act Precludes the Non-biological
Child ofa Member of a Vermont Civil Union from Qualif ng for Child's Insurance Benefits
Under the Social Security Act 31 Op. Off. Legal Counsel (2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/2007/saadomaopinionI0-16-07final.pdf.
54. Id.
55. See Courtney G. Joslin, Interstate Recognition of Parentage in a Time of
Disharmony Same-Sex Parent Families and Beyond, 70 OHiO ST. L.J. 563, 570-71 (2009)
[hereinafter Joslin, Interstate Recognition].
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state may not recognize the presumptive parentage of the nonbiological mother
deriving from the couple's relationship, especially if the state, by its
constitution or by statute, does not recognize the couple's relationship.56
Because of this uncertainty, lawyers in the states that do have the parentage
presumption for couples who marry, enter civil unions, or register domestic
partnerships urge their clients to nonetheless complete a second-parent
57adoption or obtain an order of parentage. But uncertain is not the same as
valueless. The parentage presumption does confer parentage, and advocates for
lesbian couples and their children are prepared to defend that status against
challenges.
The parentage presumption for a same-sex spouse/partner, however, goes
only part of the way in settling the child's parentage. The law of the state
creating the presumption needs to settle when, by whom, and on what grounds
the presumption can be rebutted. Sometimes state law is unsettled about when,
by whom, and on what grounds the presumption in a husband is rebutted.58
Even if that standard is clear, it may be a poor fit to apply the identical standard
to a presumption attaching to a same-sex partner. If lack of a biological tie
always rebuts the presumption, or if lack of biology is the onlyway to rebut the
presumption, a court does not have adequate tools to assess the parentage of the
child of a lesbian couple. The recently enacted District of Columbia parentage
legislation, discussed later in this Article, fills in the gaps that presently exist in
the marital presumption provisions of other jurisdictions.59
B. Obtaining an Order of Parentage or Parental Rights Under Existing State
Laws
A presumption based on a couple's formal status is not the only method of
extending parentage to the partner of a woman who gives birth. All states
56. See inta Part V.B. For a thorough discussion of this issue, including the many
arguments that support recognition of the parent-child relationship in other states, see
COURTNEY G. JOSLIN & SHANNON P. MINTER, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER
FAMILY LAW § § 6:10-6:14 (2009).
57. See GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS (GLAD), How TO GET MARRIED IN
MASSACHUSETTS 26, available at http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/publications/how-to-
get-married-ma.pdf. The publication states:
In Massachusetts, a child born into a marriage is presumed to be the child of both parties,
and both parents' names are listed on the birth certificate. Nonetheless, this is just a
presumption and does not have the same effect as a court judgment. It is subject to being
challenged and overturned.
In addition, the marriage could encounter a lack of respect in some states, so relying on
the fact of the marriage alone to protect your children is not the best approach. Therefore,
GLAD strongly recommends that you consult a lawyer and continue the practice of securing
a second-parent adoption in order to obtain a decree of legal parenthood that should be
recognized broadly outside of Massachusetts, independent of the marriage.
58. See irDna text accompanying notes 194-95, 222-29.
59. See discussion infra Part 1V.B.1-2.
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establish legal parentage by statute. Courts have been asked to apply existing
law to parentage questions, and, in a few instances, they have found that a
nonbiological mother is a parent. Delaware also recently amended its parentage
statute with same-sex couples in mind. Its new law has numerous strengths but
is still unlikely to confer parentage from birth without court involvement.
1. The California Uniform Parentage Act
California courts have interpreted two standard provisions of the Uniform
Parentage Act (UPA) to find a biological mother's same-sex partner the parent
of a child. The California UPA includes the provision that a man is the
presumed parent of a child if he "receives the child into his home and openly
holds out the child as his natural child., 60 It also includes the provision that, in
determining the existence of a mother-child relationship, "[i]nsofar as
practicable, the provisions of this part applicable to the father and child
relationship apply.,
61
In Elisa B. v. Superior CoUr46 2 the El Dorado County District Attorney
brought a parentage action after the biological mother, Emily, sought public
63
assistance for herself and her twin children. The California Supreme Court
ruled that Emily's former partner, Elisa, was a parent of the twins. The court
concluded that Elisa both received the children into her home and held them
out as her natural children; had she been a man, this would have made her a
presumed father. 64 Applying this means of establishing a father-child
60. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2009).
61. Id. § 7650.
62. 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005).
63. Political scientist Anna Marie Smith critiques the Elisa B. decision from a very
important perspective. While recognizing the value of defining parenthood to include a
nonbiological mother, she argues that advocates for LGBT parents should not ignore the
other important context of the case-poverty law's imposition of mandatory child-support
enforcement obligations on welfare recipients. She distinguishes a case brought by Emily
herself because she chose to pursue support from Elisa from the actual case in which Emily
had no choice in the matter because poverty law removes that choice for mothers who need
public assistance. She writes:
Poverty law is not a neutral legal context for advancing LGBT rights and the rights of
assisted reproduction families since its rules mandating cooperation with child support
enforcement are punitive for poor mothers on welfare, violate their rights to privacy and self-
determination, and expose them to a substantial risk of domestic violence. Any enhancement
of TANF's child support rules that strengthens the grip of the post-welfare state on poor
women and men in cases involving non-heterosexual parties or the children born as a result
of assisted reproductive technologies contributes one more piece of ammunition to the
neoliberal attack on the poor.
Anna Marie Smith, Reproductive Technology, Family La w and the Postwelthre State: The
California Same-ScxParents'Rights "Victories" of200S, 34 SIGNS 4 (2009).
64. The court had held previously that a nonbiological father could be a parent under
the "holding out" provision of the statute. See In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004); In re
Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002).
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relationship to the determination of a mother-child relationship, the court found
that Elisa was a presumed parent. 65 It further found that the case was an
inappropriate one for rebutting the presumption of parentage. 
66
The court found that a child can have two parents, both women. 67 Although
not applicable in the case, the court cited the state's newly enacted domestic
partnership law, making those who register the parents of a child born to either
68of them, as support for such a finding. The court also noted the availability of
69
second-parent adoption. Importantly, the Elisa B. holding established that
neither formal registration nor adoption is necessary to a determination of
parentage.
In a subsequent case, a California appeals court applied Elisa B. in the
context of an action by a nonbiological mother, Charisma, to be declared a
legal parent and obtain visitation rights with her daughter, Amalia; the
biological mother, Kristina, opposed her petition.70 These facts emerged in the
case: the couple had jointly selected an anonymous semen donor from a sperm
bank; Charisma was there when Amalia was born, and she cut the umbilical
cord; the parents gave the child a last name consisting of their two names
hyphenated; Charisma was listed as a parent on a birth announcement, a gift
registry, an online message board for women trying to conceive, at a baby
shower, and to everyone; and the parents took their daughter home and cared
for her together for six weeks, after which Kristina returned to work and
Charisma cared for Amalia full-time during the day for seven weeks.71
Then Kristina moved out with Amalia and denied Charisma access to her.
The appeals court affirmed the trial court's order that Charisma was Amalia's
parent, rejecting Kristina's argument that Charisma had not received the child
into her home and held her out as her own long enough to meet the statutory
test as applied in Elisa B.72
No reported appellate opinion besides Elisa B. and Charisma R so clearly
names the nonbiological mother a parent of her children under a statute derived
65. Elisa R., 117 P.3d at 670.
66. Id. at 668-69.
67. Id. at 666.
68. Id. (citing CAL. FAm. CODE § 297.5).
69. Id. at 666, n.5 (citing Sharon S. v. Superior Ct., 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003)).
70. Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
71. Id. at 32-33. Kristina and Charisma were also registered domestic partners,
although that was before that status conferred the parentage presumption in California.
72. Id. at 39-45. The court also rejected Kristina's argument that the trial court order
violated her constitutional right to raise her child. Rather, the court ruled, the U.S. Supreme
Court has not told states how to define parentage, and the trial court ruling that Charisma
was a parent meant that the case concerning visitation with Amalia was a case between two
parents, not, as Kristina argued, a case between a parent and a third party. Id. at 47-52. I
develop this same argument in The Impact of Troxel v Granville on Lesbian and Gay
Parents, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 825 (2001).
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from the Uniform Parentage Act. 73 The reasoning and holdings of these cases
are important and should guide courts in other states with similar statutes. But
they are incomplete. For example, the "receives the child into his home"
requirement may mean that the partner is not a parent until the child is born. 7
And the fact-specific nature of the parentage determination means that court
involvement will almost certainly be necessary to establish parentage, thereby
defeating the law reform goal I urge-stable and certain recognition of a child's
relationship with both parents without spending time or money on judicial
proceedings.
2. The Oregon donor insemination statute
In July 2009, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that a woman who
consents to her partner's insemination is the parent of the child that results from
that insemination.7 5 Sondra Shineovich and Sarah Kemp began living together
in 1997. They decided to have a child, and Sarah conceived using donor semen.
76Their first child was born in early 2004. In 2006, the couple decided to have
another child, and again Sarah conceived using donor insemination. The couple
split up in November 2006. Their second child was born in March 2007.
Sarah denied Sondra access to the children. When the younger child was
five days old, Sondra filed an action to be declared the parent of the children.
The trial court dismissed her petition. On appeal, the court declared
unconstitutional Oregon's donor insemination statute because it made a
mother's consenting husband, but not a mother's consenting same-sex partner,
the parent of a child born using donor semen.77 Sexual orientation is a suspect
classification in Oregon, and the court applied to this case the holding of a
decade-old case that discrimination on the basis of marital status is sexual
78
orientation discrimination because same-sex couples cannot marry. The court
73. As early as 1999, some California trial courts and at least one Colorado trial court
had issued parentage orders sought by both mothers. See Kyle C. Velte, Towards
Constitutional Recognition of the Lesbian Parented Family, 26 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 245, 252-53 (2000-2001) (noting such orders). Other such California parentage
orders are discussed in Courtney G. Joslin, Interstate Recognition, supra note 55, at 585-86,
598. See also Joslin, The Legal Parentage of Children Born to Same-Sex Couples:
Developments in the Law, 39 FAM. L. Q. 683, 698-703 (2005).
74. In two cases in other states, the couple split up before the child was born and the
courts refused to order the nonbiological mother to support the child. See T.F. v. B.L. 813
N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 2004) and State exrelD.R.M., 34 P.3d 887 (Wash. App. 2001).
75. Shineovich v. Kemp, 214 P.3d 29 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
76. They married shortly before the child's birth, during the short period when
Multnomah County was issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Their marriage-as
were all the Multnomah County marriages-was declared void ab initio the following year.
Id. at 32.
77. Id. at 39-40.
78. Id. at 37 (applying Tanner v. Oregon Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct.
App. 1998)).
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reasoned, therefore, that
because same-sex couples may not marry in Oregon, that privilege is not
available to the same-sex domestic partner of a woman who gives birth to a
child conceived by artificial insemination, where the partner consented to the
procedure with the intent of being the child's second parent. We can see no
justification for denying that privilege on the basis of sexual orientation,
particularly given that same-sex couples may become legal coparents by other
means-namely, adoption. There appears to be no reason for permitting
heterosexual couples to bypass adoption proceedings by conceiving a child
through mutually consensual artificial insemination, but not permitting same-
sex couples to do so.
79
By way of remedy, the court extended the statute's coverage to include
children of mothers in lesbian relationships.80 No other state appeals court has
extended to lesbian couples the parentage provisions of a statute denominating
a consenting husband the parent of a child born to his wife using donor
insemination.8 1 The ruling is especially significant because it acknowledges a
nonbiological mother's parentage even if the child is born before the couple
separates, as happened with the younger child in this case.
It is too soon to know if this ruling will change the way Oregon maintains
its vital records so that the name of both mothers can appear on a child's birth
certificate. The recently enacted District of Columbia legislation contains a
mechanism for recording both mothers' names on the birth certificate when
they have a child using donor insemination.
82
3. Orders of parentage and determinations of parental rights in other states
A handful of other jurisdictions have produced judicial determinations of
parentage. Couples in several states have obtained orders of parentage for both
mothers when conception occurs through in vitro fertilization using donor
semen and an egg from the mother who will not give birth. The embryo is then
implanted in the uterus of the birth mother. In these instances, one woman is
the genetic parent of the child and the other is the gestating parent. Because the
law could recognize a mother-child relationship in a woman who bears the
child and in a woman who is a biological parent, judges have determined they
have the authority to issue a parentage order naming both women parents.
8 3
79. Id. at 40.
80. Id.
81. For a discussion of a New Jersey trial court opinion extending the reach of the
state's donor insemination statute, see infra text accompanying notes 84-89.
82. See irbna Part IV.A. .d.
83. Among the states are: Washington, E-mail from Janet Helson, Attorney, Skellenger
Bender, to author (Jan. 14, 2009, 11:48) (on file with author); New Jersey, E-mail from
William S. Singer, Attorney, Singer & Fedun, to author (Jan 14, 2009, 14:33) (on file with
author); and Texas, E-mail from Connie Moore, Attorney, Moore & Hunt, to author (Jan. 15,
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Some couples use this extraordinary, invasive, and expensive process
because they both want a biological connection to the child. But others go this
route primarily for legal reasons, precisely because they believe this method of
childbearing is the best protection of their joint parentage. A statutory
framework creating legal parentage for a lesbian couple regardless of biological
connection would allow such couples to pursue parenthood with less medical
intervention and at much less cost.
A New Jersey trial court used a different legal basis to issue a parentage
order for a child born of donor insemination. 84 The lesbian couple, LoCicero
and Robinson, had registered as domestic partners and had married in
Canada. 85 They agreed to raise a child together and Robinson conceived
through donor insemination, using the services of a physician. They recognized
that second-parent adoption was available, but stated that the process would
take two years and that they did not want the child in limbo during that time.
The court did not decide the validity of the Canadian marriage but used it
as one factor supporting the couple's commitment to each other. Although New
Jersey's insemination statute assigns parentage explicitly only to a husband
who consented to his wife's insemination, 86 the court interpreted the statute to
designate LoCicero a parent of the child.
Although the opinion in Robinson came from a trial court, its validity was
given a boost when it was cited by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Lewis v.
Harris, the case that held that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the legal
consequences of marriage was a violation of the state constitution.87 The Lews
court identified lack of dual parentage as a problem for a lesbian couple under
2009, 08:31 EST) (on file with author). See generally Ryiah Lilith, The G.IFT of Two
Biological and Legal Mothers, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L. 207 (2001); Kyle C.
Velte, Egging on Lesbian Maternity The Legal Implications of Tri-Gametic In Vitro
Fertilization, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 431 (1998-99); JosLIN & MINTER, supra
note 56, § 3.13.
84. In re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d 1036 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005). In the
context of a heterosexual unmarried couple, the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that both
partners were legal parents of triplets born to the woman using donor eggs. In re C.K.G., 173
S.W.3d 714 (Tenn. 2005). The court acknowledged that the woman did not fall within the
definition of a mother under the state's parentage statutes and called for legislative reform,
but in the meantime it ruled based on the specific set of facts before it that the woman was
the children's legal mother.
85. At the time, New Jersey did not extend parental rights to domestic partners. See In
re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d at 1040 ("[D]omestic partners is a status distinct from
marriage . . . [and] the status of domestic partnership neither creates nor diminishes
individual partners' rights and responsibilities toward children ..... ) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 26:8A-1). In 2006, New Jersey enacted civil unions, which extend all the legal
consequences of marriage, including presumptive parenthood, to civil union partners. Id. §
37:1-31(a), (e) (West 2009). The legislation was enacted December 21, 2006, and took effect
sixty days later. 2006 N.J. Laws 103.
86. N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:17-44 (West 2009).
87. 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2005).
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the existing law, but in a footnote the court said, "But see In re Parentage of
Child ofRobinson... (declaring that same-sex partner was entitled to statutory
presumption of parenthood afforded to husbands). 88 Seen as a seal of approval
on the reasoning of Robinson, this reference resulted in New Jersey's
willingness to put the names of both mothers on a child's birth certificate. 89
In the context of ruling on the ability of a nonbiological mother to maintain
a relationship with her child after the couple splits up, some courts have
invoked parentage statutes or otherwise denominated the nonbiological mother
a parent. 90 In In re L.B., for example, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that
if Sue Carvin could show she was a de facto parent of L.B. then she would
stand in "legal parity" to the child's biological mother, Page Britain.91 The
couple had planned for the child together and raised her as two mothers for six
years.
After the couple split and Britain denied Carvin access to their child,
Carvin filed a petition for the establishment of parentage. Although the court
found that the state's statutes, modeled on the Uniform Parentage Act, did not
apply to Carvin, it identified a common law basis for declaring that a "de
facto" parent stands in legal parity with "an otherwise legal parent." The court
concluded that "reason and common sense support recognizing the existence of
de facto parents and according them the rights and responsibilities which attach
to parents in this state." 92 Lawyers now use the LB. decision to obtain
judgments of parentage, and one lawyer reports a case in which a judge ordered
that the de facto parent's name be added to the child's birth certificate.
93
4. The Delaware de facto parent statute
A novel statute enacted in Delaware in July 2009 creates legal parentage
for the partner of a woman who gives birth to or adopts a child under many
circumstances. 94 The statute was a direct response to a decision some months
earlier by the Delaware Supreme Court. In that case, Smith v. Gordon, the court
reversed a trial court order granting joint custody to both partners when only
88. Id.at216,n.19.
89. Telephone Interview with William Singer, Attorney in New Jersey (Dec. 19, 2008).
There is some ambiguity about this, however, as the state's form indicating consent to
artificial insemination appears to be limited to married and civil union partners. See New
Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, Consent for Artificial Insemination
(2008), http://www.state.nj.us/health/forms/reg-64.pdf.
90. See, e.g., Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000).
91. InreParentage ofL.B., 122 P.3d 161, 175 (Wash. 2005).
92. Id. at 176.
93. E-mail from Janet Helson, Attorney, Skellenger Bender, to author (Feb. 4, 2009,
14:54) (on file with author).
94. The bill is codified in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(a)(4), (b)(6), (c) (2009).
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one had legally adopted the child in Kazakhstan. 95 The court found that the
Delaware legislature had enacted comprehensive parentage statutes in 2004,
and that had it wanted to codify the concept of "de facto" parent it could have
done so at that time. The court refused to do what the legislature had failed to
do.
The legislature responded by amending the state's Uniform Parentage Act.
A man or a woman who meets the statutory definition of de facto parent is a
parent, with a legal status identical to that of a woman who gives birth to or
adopts a child. 96 The statute defines de facto parent as follows:
De facto parent status is established if the Family Court determines that the de
facto parent:
(1) Has had the support and consent of the child's parent or parents who
fostered the formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship
between the child and the de facto parent;
(2) Has exercised parental responsibility for the child as that term is defined
in § 1101 of this title; and
(3) Has acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have
established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child that is
parental in nature.
97
This statute makes a substantial contribution to law reform affecting same-
sex couples having children. Unlike California or Oregon, whose advances
came from appellate court interpretation of statutes that did not explicitly
contemplate two mothers for a child, Delaware now has a statute passed with
same-sex couples in mind. The statute's strength is that it creates legal parity
between the two partners.
It also has some unique characteristics. The statute creates parental status
when one parent has adopted, rather than given birth to, the child. It also can
create parental status, without necessitating adoption, for a person who does not
plan for a child's birth or adoption but comes into the child's life at a later
date. 98 Finally, it authorizes three parents for a child, as a child may have two
95. 968 A.2d 1 (Del. 2009).
96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(a)(4), (b)(6) (2009). The legislature made the
statute retroactive and also stated that "[n]o Court decision based upon a finding that
Delaware does not recognize de facto parent status shall have collateral estoppel or res
judicata effect." 77 Del. Laws ch. 97 §§ 5-6. This explicitly authorizes the mother who lost
in Smith v Gordon to relitigate her action for custody of the child.
97. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2009). The Delaware Code defines "parental
responsibilities" as "the care, support and control of the child in a manner that provides for
the child's necessary physical needs, including adequate food, clothing and shelter, and that
also provides for the mental and emotional health and development of such child." Id. §
1101(10).
98. The District of Columbia has a statute that confers de facto parent status on a
partner in both these circumstances. The de facto parent becomes equally entitled to custody
or visitation and equally obligated to support the child, but she does not become a full legal
parent of the child. See irnta Part IV.A.2.b. The Delaware statute can also confer parental
status on the male partner of a man who becomes a parent using a surrogate.
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legal parents and a de facto parent who, by court order, also becomes the
child's parent.
99
The statute's weakness is that it seems not to confer parentage
automatically at the child's birth, even when the child is born through assisted
conception and the couple planned for the child together.100 Rather, the statute
refers to establishment of de facto parent status through a determination made
by the Family Court. At the very least, that suggests that a nonbiological
mother must petition for a parentage order and will not appear as a parent on
the child's birth certificate absent such an order.
Further, a court might determine that it cannot issue such an order until
some period of time has elapsed after the child's birth. The statutory criteria
stem in part from the Delaware Supreme Court's discussion in Smith of how a
legislature might define de facto status. 10 1 While a strong argument can be
made that a partner's pre-birth actions in caring for her pregnant partner and
participating in prenatal care meet the test of "exercis[ing] parental
responsibilities," it will be more difficult to argue that the partner has parented
"for a length of time sufficient to have established a bonded and dependent
relationship with the child," until some time after birth.
C. Concluding Thoughts on the Inadequacy of Existing Laws
The legislative and judicial determinations of parentage discussed in this
section are positive but incomplete responses to the phenomenon of lesbian
couples bearing a child together. The states that afford recognition to
married/unioned/partnered same-sex couples have created a presumption of the
spouse's or partner's parentage, but this is inadequate on two grounds. The lack
of statutory clarity on when, by whom, and on what basis the parentage
presumption can be rebutted results in an unacceptable level of uncertainty
99. For a discussion of three parents in the context of the District of Columbia's law
reform, see infra Part IV.A.2.b.
100. Delaware does create parentage for a man who consents to a woman's
insemination with the intent to be a parent, even if he is not married to the woman. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-703 (2009); id. § 8-201(b)(5). A court should apply this provision to
create parentage for a woman who consents to a woman's insemination, by means of DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-106 (2009), which states that "[p]rovisions of this chapter relating to
determination of paternity apply to determinations of maternity." The Court in Smith v.
Gordon approved an expansive and gender-neutral reading of the state's parentage act when
it noted that "had Gordon resided with [the child] for at least two years after the adoption
and held [the child] out as her child during that time, she apparently would have been able to
establish a legal parent-child relationship." 968 A.2d 1, 16-17. In that case, however, Gordon
had lived with the child for only thirteen months. An argument that distinguishing between a
man who consents to a woman's insemination and a woman who consents to a woman's
insemination is unconstitutional sex discrimination should also succeed. For discussion of
conferring parentage through a marital status-neutral and gender-neutral consent to
insemination statute, see inr#a Part IV.A.
101. See Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 8-16 (Del. 2009).
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threatening the stability of a child's family. In addition, such a scheme offers
no protection to the children of couples who have not married or entered civil
unions or domestic partnerships. The law should not countenance a second-
class status for those children whose parents do not formalize their status. That
throwback to the bad old days of "illegitimacy" 10 2 should have no place in the
twenty-first century world of the children of lesbian couples.
The California and Oregon courts are to be commended for interpreting
their existing statutes to protect parent-child relationships in lesbian families
under certain factual circumstances. The Delaware statute is also an enormous
advance. But the Elisa B. doctrine cannot confer parentage before the child's
birth, and the Delaware law may apply only after a period of co-parenting has
elapsed. All of these states seem to require case-by-case determinations. None
provides the clear and simple establishment of parenthood-without court
invention-that constitutes the norm for heterosexual couples. After presenting
examples of statutory developments in other countries, I turn to a description of
the recent District of Columbia parentage legislation and offer it as a model for
law reform efforts in other states.
III. INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES OF STATUTES ESTABLISHING Two MOTHERS
FROM BIRTH
A number of Canadian provinces, Australia, and several European
countries have legislation extending parental status to lesbian couples.
Establishing parentage does not require a judicial proceeding. In most
instances, the couple need not be married or in a registered relationship, even if
the country affords such an option. 103 While some state lawmakers may be
indifferent to these international developments, others will be pleased to learn
that a larger context exists for the changes sought by advocates for lesbian
couples in the United States.
A. Quebec
In 2002, Quebec became the first jurisdiction in the world to enact
legislation explicitly extending parental status to both members of a lesbian
couple upon the birth of a child. Although Vermont's civil union status dates to
2000, Vermont did not otherwise rewrite its parentage statutes to address the
circumstances of same-sex couples. Quebec, in 2002, instituted civil union
102. See supra Part I.A.
103. For both Canada and Australia this approach is consistent with the rest of their
law, which makes marrying virtually irrelevant in determining the legal consequences of
living as a couple. See NANcY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE:
VALuING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 111-15 (2008) [hereinafter POLIKOFF, BEYOND
MARRIAGE].
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status and changed its parentage laws. 104 Quebec also is unique in that it has
the only law that explicitly addresses assisted conception through sexual
intercourse as well as donor insemination.
Quebec enacted a new chapter into its filiation code to address children
born of assisted procreation. It begins:
A parental project involving assisted procreation exists from the moment a
person alone decides or spouses by mutual consent decide, in order to have a
child, to resort to the genetic material of a person who is not party to the
.. .105
parental project.
The person who contributed the genetic material does not become the
child's parent. If a woman is unmarried, she is the child's sole parent.
"Spouses" includes married couples, same-sex couples in civil unions, and
same- and different-sex couples who are "de facto" spouses. 10 6 A "spouse," so
defined, becomes a presumed parent of the child from birth. The presumption is
rebutted "if there was no mutual parental project or if it is established that the
child was not born of assisted procreation."
' 10 7
Both women are registered as the child's parents using the customary
administrative mechanism for establishing parents; no judicial process is
necessary. The only difference between couples who are married/in civil unions
and those who are not (the ones called "de facto") is that one married/civil
union partner may register the other as well as herself, each "de facto" partner
must register herself. But if a "de facto" partner fails to register after consenting
to a parenting project she is still liable for supporting the child. 108
Under the Quebec statute, assisted procreation can occur both through
insemination with donor semen and through sexual intercourse. Professor
Robert Leckey explains that the legislature knew of the history of
discrimination against lesbians seeking medical assistance with assisted
reproduction and deliberately sought to minimize professional involvement in
parenting by same-sex couples. He states that the lack of required formalities,
such as notarized writings, "evidences the legislature's wish not to encumber
same-sex couples with administrative burdens not borne by opposite-sex
104. Although the statutes themselves are in French, as well as almost all of the
commentary, McGill University law professor Robert Leckey has written in English about
these legal reforms. My account here is taken from his translation and analysis. Robert
Leckey, Where the Parents Are of the Same Sex: Quebec's Reforms to Filiation, 23 INT'L J.
L., POL'Y & FAM. 62 (2009) [hereinafter Leckey, Where the Parents].
105. QUEBEC CIV. CODE, S.Q., art. 538 (2002).
106. At the time the law was enacted, same-sex couples could not marry in Canada, but
they could enter civil unions in Quebec. Same-sex couples obtained the option to marry in
2005. For the history of Canada's treatment of same-sex couples and its approval of
marriage for same-sex couples in 2005, see Nicolas Bala, The Debates About Same-Sex
Marriage in Canada and the United States, 20 BYU J. PuB. L. 195, 209-21 (2006).
107. QUEBEC CIV. CODE, S.Q. art. 539 (2009).
108. Id. at art. 540.
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couples when they procreate."
' 10 9
There is one difference in Quebec law based on method of conception.
When there has been sexual intercourse, the man's parentage may be
established during the first year of the child's life. The biological mother's
same-sex partner can declare herself a parent when the child is born, but if the
biological father seeks parentage during the child's first year he will
simultaneously eliminate the partner's legal bond to the child. 110 The statute
does not permit three persons-the mother, her partner, and the biological
father-to be recognized as a child's parents. 
111
U.S. courts have consistently maintained a sharp legal line based on
method of conception. If conception occurs through sexual intercourse, an
agreement to treat the conception as though it had been through donor
insemination will not be enforced.112 The intent of the two participants is key
under the Quebec law, but in the United States it has relevance only if
109. Robert Leckey, Filiation and the Translation of Legal Concepts, in LEGAL
ENGINEERING AND COMPARATIVE LAW (Cashin Ritaine et al. eds. 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1308626 at 5 [hereinafter Leckey, Filiation].
110. The statute is unclear as to who may establish parentage during this year. While it
seems written with an eye towards the man who might decide to claim parentage, it could be
read as enabling the mother or a legal representative of the child to establish the man's
parentage. Scholars have pointed out that if the purpose of this provision was to allow a man
to change his mind, the class of those eligible to claim parentage during the child's first year
should have included all donors known to the mother, including known semen donors, rather
than only those who participated in conception through sexual intercourse. See Leckey,
Where the Parents, supra note 104, at 68. Nonetheless, it is the method of conception that
matters under the law. This aspect of the law is discussed in a 2007 case, Droit de la
famille--7527, [2007] R.J.Q. 493, 2007 QCCA 362 (Can.), available at
http://www.canlii.org/en/qc/qcca/doc/2007/2007qcca362/2007qcca362.html. It was clear in
the case that two women were in a relationship and that they were planning to raise a child
together when they selected a man as a sperm donor. When conception through insemination
was not successful, the biological mother, unbeknownst to her partner, had sexual
intercourse with the donor. A child was born, the couple later split up, and eventually the
biological mother denied the nonbiological mother access to the child. After the "parental
project" legislation was enacted, but before it went into effect, the nonbiological mother
informed the biological mother that she would file an action for filiation. In order to thwart
that effort, the biological father, at the request of the biological mother, obtained an order of
filiation as the father of the child. The parentage law could apply to already born children,
and the trial court did find that when the child was conceived the intent of all involved was
that the man would not be a father but would be a sperm donor for the purpose of the couple
having a child. The trial court ruled in the nonbiological mother's action, however, that
because conception occurred through sexual intercourse the biological father had one year
from the effective date of the law to file his filiation action. The nonbiological mother
appealed, and the appeals court affirmed on the different ground that the consent to judgment
of filiation filed before the effective date of the new law resulted in a judgment that could
not be disturbed once the new law became effective.
111. An Ontario court interpreted its common law parenspatriae power to declare that
a child had three parents in AA v B.B., [2007] 83 O.R. 3d 561, 2007 ONCA 2 (Can.). Leave
to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada was refused.
112. See, e.g., Straub v. B.M.T., 645 N.E.2d 597 (Ind. 1994).
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insemination is the method of conception.
B. Other Canadian Provinces
Manitoba has amended its birth registration statutes in a way that
recognizes lesbian couples as parents. Manitoba's 2002 Charter Compliance
Act created equality between same-sex and different-sex, married and
unmarried, couples. 113 It amended the portion of its Vital Statistics Act that
already recognized the parentage of a husband whose wife bears a child using
assisted conception to include both same-sex and different-sex partners. The
biological and nonbiological mother follow the procedures to both be registered
as the child's parents. Birth certificates now list parents as "parents," rather
than as "mother" and "father."
There is no other legislation clearly delineating that birth registration
establishes parentage. Professor Karen Busby has reported that most advocates
believe that registration does establish parentage. 1 4 She knows of no instance
since the law went into effect where a nonbiological mother's parentage has
been challenged when her name appeared on the birth certificate. Nonetheless,
Professor Busby considers it possible that parentage based on the birth
registration alone may be still less secure than that achieved through
adoption. 1
15
As a result of a court decision, lesbian couples in Ontario can register as
parents of a child born to either of them. In Rutherford v Ontario, four lesbian
couples sought parentage orders. 116 They argued that refusing to recognize both
partners as parents violated the Canadian Charter's equality guarantee. The
court agreed. Subsequently, new administrative regulations were promulgated
to permit the names of both mothers to be registered on the child's birth
certificate, when birth occurs through assisted conception.
C. Australia
In 2002, Australian states began recognizing a lesbian couple as parents of
a child born to either of them.117 In 2008, Australian federal law reform built onthese efforts and established that the de facto partner of a woman who bears a
113. The Charter Compliance Act, S.M. 2002, c. 24 (2002).
114. See E-mail from Karen Busby, Professor of Law, University of Manitoba Faculty
of Law to author (Feb. 23, 2009, 18:54) (on file with author).
115. Id.
116. Rutherford v. Ontario (2006) 270 D.L.R. (4th).
117. The first state was Western Australia in 2002. The Northern Territory (2003),
Australian Capital Territory (2004), Victoria (2008) and New South Wales (2008) followed.
See Jenni Millbank, Recognition ofLesbian and GayFamilies in Australian Law-Part Two:
Children, 34 FED. L. REv. 261 (2006). For New South Wales reforms, see
http://glrl.org.au/index.php/Rights/Parenting/New-Lesbian-Parenting-Laws.
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child conceived through donor insemination is the legal parent of the child if
she consented to the insemination. 118 The law is retroactive. Therefore, all
existing children born to lesbian couples through donor insemination, where the
partner of the birth mother consented to the insemination, now have two
parents. In those instances, the couple can apply for a new birth certificate
listing both women as parents.11 9 The retroactivity of the law encompasses all
families, including those where the couple has since separated. A semen donor
is not a parent under the Australian law, and a child cannot have three
parents. 
120
The new federal statutes contain a unique provision concerning adopted
children. Adoption is governed by state law in Australia, and some states do not
permit a lesbian couple to jointly adopt a child. The new law addresses this by
recognizing the partner of a woman who adopts as a second parent if she
consented to the adoption. 121
D. European Countries
Iceland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom establish the
partner of a lesbian who conceives through donor insemination as the parent of
the resulting child. 122 All five countries allow same-sex couples to either marry
(Norway, Spain, and Sweden) or enter a registered partnership (Iceland and
Great Britain). Spain and Sweden extend automatic parentage only to married
lesbian couples; in the other countries all consenting partners are included.
118. De facto partnership is a well-established concept in Australian family law, for
both different-sex and same-sex couples. See generally Millbank, Recognition of Lesbian
and Gay Families in Australian Law-Part One: Couples (2006), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfinabstract id=910138. For a comprehensive
description of the 2008 Australian federal law reforms, see Jenni Millbank, De Facto
Relationships, Same-Sex and Surrogate Parents. Eploring the Scope and Effects of the
2008 FederalRelationship Reforms, 23 AUST J. FAM. LAW 160 (2009) [hereinafter Millbank,
2008 Federal Rela tionship Reforms].
119. See Millbank, 2008 Federal Relationship Reforms, supra note 118; Gay and
Lesbian Rights Lobby, Federal Same Sex Parenting Reforms, http://glrl.org.au/index.php/
Rights/Parenting/Federal-Same-Sex-Parenting-Reforms (last visited Dec. 22, 2009).
120. Australia does, however, allow a court to order visitation between a child and a
person who has an existing relationship with that child. That would include a known donor if
the mothers permitted a relationship to develop between him and the child.
121.The relevant statute reads: "For the purposes of this Act, a child is the child of a
person who has, or had, a de facto partner if ... the child is adopted by the person and the
person's de facto partner or by either of them with the consent of the other." FLA
s60HA(I)(b). In the United States, the only statute that confers parental status on the partner
of a woman who adopts without that partner concluding a second-parent adoption is the
recent Delaware statute. See supra Part IJ.B.4.
122. Kees Waaldijk, Overview of Forms of Joint Legal Parenting Available to Same-
Sex Couples in European Countries, 72 DROIT EN SOCIETE 383, 384 (2009) (Fr.). The
information about the United Kingdom's Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 is
available online at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/2992.html.
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Unlike Canada and Australia, all the European countries limit application
of the law to inseminations that take place using the services of a medical
facility. In other words, children of lesbians who conceive without medical
assistance are unprotected; their nonbiological mothers must complete a
second-parent adoption. 123
The initial American laws on donor insemination of married women in the
1970s specified physician involvement because that was the practice at the
time, and many of those laws, unfortunately, remain in effect today. The
twenty-first century U.S. model laws, however, explicitly reject such a
restriction. 124 Any law designed to be comprehensive should include all of the
ways that people form families using assisted conception, and that must include
those who do inseminations without medical participation.
IV. PARENTAGE STATUTES FOR CHILDREN OF LESBIAN COUPLES IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
This Article focuses on protecting the child of a lesbian couple by
recognizing her relationship with both her parents. Since Harry Krause's
transformative efforts of the 1960s and 1970s, the guiding tenet of parentage
law reform has been equality for children born to married and unmarried
parents.125 That principle must extend to the children of lesbian couples. It is a
principle distinct from the gains achieved by the marriage-equality movement,
whose focus lies on recognition of the couple relationship. Law reform for the
children of lesbian couples must encompass both parents who marry or enter
civil unions/domestic partnerships (when those options are available) and those
who don't.
This Part advocates two distinct paths to legal parentage for lesbian
couples. The first is available when conception occurs through donor
insemination and is not dependent upon the legal relationship of the two
women to each other. Where marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership is
available to same-sex couples, it would be unnecessary for the couple to
formalize their relationship through these mechanisms.
123. All five countries, as well as Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, and the
Netherlands allow a nonbiological mother to become a second parent of her partner's child
through adoption. Waaldijk, supra note 122, at 384.
124. The Comment to Section 702 of the Uniform Parentage Act (2002) reads:
UPA (1973) § 5(b) specified that a male donor would not be considered the father of a child
born of artificial insemination if the sperm was provided to a licensed physician for use in
artificial insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife. The new Act does not
continue the requirement that the donor provide the sperm to a licensed physician.
Neither the 2002 UPA nor the 2008 American Bar Association Model Act Governing
Assisted Reproductive Technology contain any requirement that a physician must be
involved in the insemination for a consenting partner to be considered the child's parent. See
infra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
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While Quebec's "parental project" laws make legal status entirely
dependent upon the intent of those participating in the project, regardless of
method of conception, such an approach would find no support in U.S. state
legislatures. No state will want to open its courts to men arguing they should
not have to support their biological children because sexual intercourse
occurred with the intent that only the woman would be the parent of the
resulting child. 126 It is entirely plausible, however, that U.S. law would make
parentage without a judicial proceeding possible for lesbian couples who use
donor insemination rather than sexual intercourse to conceive. The District of
Columbia and New Mexico did so in 2009.
The second path to parentage is dependent upon the couple's status rather
than the method of conception. It starts with the presumption as it exists now in
the states that grant a formal status to same-sex couples, but, unlike the current
framework in those states, it articulates when and by whom the presumption
can be rebutted.
The 2009 District of Columbia legislation contains both these paths.
127
This Part describes D.C.'s statutory scheme, including both its substantive law
of parentage and the related statutes on birth certificates that guarantee that
parentage is properly recorded without court involvement.
A. Parentage Arising from Assisted Reproduction
Lesbian couples commonly conceive through insemination of one partner
with donor semen. If the couple uses semen from an unknown donor, as is
usual when the semen comes from a sperm bank or other medical facility, the
primary legal issue a statute must address is the status of the birth mother's
partner. If the couple uses semen from an identified donor, the law must also
clarify that person's legal status. The existence of a known donor raises the
126. I have argued elsewhere that when both parties do have this intent, they should be
able to consensually terminate the man's parental rights after the child is born. See Nancy D.
Polikoff, The Deliberate Construction of Families Without Fathers. Is It an Option for
Lesbian and Heterosexual Mothers?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 375 (1996) [hereinafter
Polikoff, Deliberate Construction]. In states that permit second-parent adoption, this
happens routinely as part of the adoption process. I propose the same availability when there
is no second parent but there is agreement that the mother will be the child's only legal
parent. Law reform to facilitate this result requires a statute that allows a private party,
including a parent, to petition for termination of parental rights and that identifies consent as
a substantive basis for terminating parental rights. A minority of states now allow this. Id. Of
course this does not achieve the goal in the Quebec law of identifying a child's legal
parent(s) without a judicial proceeding.
127. DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP JuDIcIAL DETERMINATION OF PARENTAGE ACT OF 2009,
D.C. Law 18-33 (D.C. 2009), 56 D.C. Reg. 4269 (June 5, 2009), available at
http://www.dccouncil.us/images/00001/20090511122621.pdf The New Mexico statute,
effective January 1, 2010, gives parental status to the female partner of a woman who bears a
child through donor insemination. New Mexico Uniform Parentage Act, 2009 N.M. Laws
215, §§ 7-703, 7-704. See discussion infra Part WV.A.1.
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questions of whether a child may have three legal parents and whether a donor
who is not a child's legal parent may have some rights or obligations with
respect to that child. This section focuses on each of these issues.
1. The status of a partner
a. Consent is the key
When a lesbian couple decides to have a child, one woman commonly
conceives using donor semen. A statute delineating that her consenting partner
is also the child's parent is a simple means of establishing her parentage, and
this is exactly what recent legislation in New Mexico and the District of
Columbia accomplishes. The D.C. legislation reads: "A person who consents to
the artificial insemination of a woman as provided in subparagraph (A) or (B)
with the intent to be the parent of her child, is conclusively established as a
parent of the resulting child." 128 The New Mexico statute reads: "A person
who.., consents to assisted reproduction as provided in Section 7-704... with
the intent to be the parent of a child is a parent of the resulting child." 
129
States that grant the consequences of marriage to lesbian couples who
marry or enter civil unions or domestic partnerships need such a statute in
addition to the parentage presumption that arises from the couple's
relationship. Two Massachusetts cases, TF. v. B.L. and AH. v MP., illustrate
why. 130
Consistent with the Uniform Parentage Act as originally written in 1973,
Massachusetts law makes a husband who consents to his wife's insemination
the father of the resulting child. 131 In TF. v. B.L., a woman, B.L., consented to
her partner T.F.'s insemination but left the relationship before the child was
born and refused to support the child. At the time, Massachusetts did not allow
same-sex couples to marry, but by the time this case reached the Supreme
Judicial Court it did allow such marriages. Had the couple been married, B.L.
would have been the child's parent; the court stated this explicitly. 132 In the
128. SeeD.C. CODE § 16-909(e)(1) (2001).
129. New Mexico Uniform Parentage Act, 2009 N.M. Laws 215 § 7-703.
130. A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061 (Mass. 2006); T.F. v. B.L, 813 N.E.2d 1244
(Mass. 2004).
131. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 4B (2009).
132. TF. v. BL., 813 N.E.2d at 1249. Courts have repeatedly held that a husband who
consents to his wife's insemination is the parent of the resulting child even if the couple
splits up before the child is born. See, e.g., Laura W.W. v. Peter W.W., 856 N.Y.S.2d 248
(N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (so holding). For additional cases, see Courtney G. Joslin, Assisted
Reproductive Technology and the Marriage Requirement: Harming the Well-Being of
Children Through Exclusionary Parentage Rules 40 n.150 and accompanying text (October
29, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Joslin, Assisted
Reproductive Technology].
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absence of marriage, the court found neither statutory nor common law
authority for determining that B.L. had responsibility for supporting the child.
In AH. v M.P., the couple used in vitro fertilization which resulted in
M.P.'s pregnancy. Both women signed the consent forms at the fertility clinic.
A.H.'s surname became the child's middle name, and the child called M.P.
"Mommy" and A.H. "Mama." The couple's relationship ended when the child
was almost two years old, and M.P. refused A.H. access to the child. A.H.
instituted a court proceeding asking for joint custody and for an order requiring
her to pay child support. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected
every theory she advanced as a basis for maintaining her relationship with the
child. Had the couple been married, the decades old statute on donor
insemination of married couples would have secured A.H.'s parentage.
133
Thus, today, in Massachusetts-the first state granting same-sex couples
the opportunity to marry-children of lesbian couples fall into the same two-
tier legal structure that, for centuries, plagued children born to unmarried
heterosexual women. Those whose parents marry have a legally recognized
relationship with both parents; those whose parents don't marry are denied
access to the emotional and economic security that all children need. Such a
tragic result can be avoided by enactment of a gender-neutral and marital
status-neutral statute assigning parentage based on consent to the insemination
with the intent to parent.
b. Model laws approve consent as the basis for assigning parentage
A brief history of the law of assisted reproduction demonstrates that the
groundwork for a statute making consent the key to parentage, as New Mexico
and the District of Columbia have done, is in place and has support from the
mainstream of the legal profession.
When a married woman bears a child conceived using donor semen, her
husband is the father of the child if he consented to the insemination procedure.
The 1973 UPA contained such a provision, 134 settling an issue that had arisen
in certain cases in which a husband argued that his wife's insemination was
adultery or that he was otherwise not the child's father. 135 Currently, more than
half the states have statutes that explicitly delineate this result. 136 In others it islikely that a court would apply the principle of estoppel to prevent either the
133. A.H. could have secured her status through a second-parent adoption. It is the
fundamental premise of this article, however, that a woman in A.H.'s position is a parent by
virtue of her consent to her partner's insemination with the intent to parent, and that as a
parent she should not have to adopt her own child.
134. UNF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973).
135. See Walter Wadlington, Artificial Insemination: The Danger of a Poorly Kept
Secret 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 777, 788 (1970).
136. Professor Joslin lists approximately thirty-five jurisdictions with such statutes.
Joslin, Assisted Reproductive Technology, supra note 132, at 9 n.21 and accompanying text.
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husband or the wife from later challenging the presumption of parentage that
attaches to every man whose wife bears a child. 137
The 1973 UPA was drafted early in the family law revolution that
equalized the status of children born to married and unmarried women, and
drafters limited the donor insemination provision to husbands and wives. But
when the subsequent UPA, promulgated in 2000, contained the same limitation,
numerous scholars and lawyers objected. They persuaded the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) to revise the
law to extend the principle of equal treatment to both married and unmarried
parents who conceive using donor semen.139
Thus, the 2002 UPA reads:
A man who.., consents to assisted reproduction by a woman as provided in
[this statute] with the intent to be the parent of her child, is a parent of the
resulting child. 140
The accompanying comment states that:
This provision reflects the concern for the best interests of nonmarital as well
as marital children of assisted reproduction demonstrated throughout the Act.
Given the dramatic increase in the use of ART in the United States during the
past decade, it is crucial to clarify the parentage of all of the children born as a
result of modem science. 141
NCCUSL in 2002 did not explicitly address the circumstance of a lesbian
couple bearing a child together using donor semen. 142 Within a few years,
137. See, e.g., Dews v. Dews, 632 A.2d 1160, 1169 (D.C. 1993) ("A husband even
belatedly consenting to artificial insemination may well consider himself, and be considered
by the courts, to have a duty to support that child. At the very least, he would most likely be
estopped in many cases to deny that duty.").
138. See John J. Sampson, Preface to the Amendments to the Uniform Parentage Act
(2002), 37 FAM. L.Q. 1, 2-3 (2003) (summarizing the history of these objections).
139. The preface to the 2002 UPA reads:
The amendments of 2002 are the end-result of objections lodged by the American Bar
Association Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities and the ABA Committee on
the Unmet Legal Needs of Children, based on the view that in certain respects the 2000
version did not adequately treat a child of unmarried parents equally with a child of married
parents. Because equal treatment of nonmarital children was a hallmark of the 1973 Act, the
objections caused the drafters of the 2000 version to reconsider certain sections of the Act.
Through extended discussion and a meeting of representatives of all the entities involved, a
determination was made that the objections had merit.
Preface to UPA (2002).
140. UPA § 703 (2002). Delaware, North Dakota, and Wyoming have enacted this
provision into law. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 8-703 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-61
(2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-903 (2009). A statute that extends parental status to a man
who consents to a woman's insemination but not to a woman who consents to a woman's
insemination may run afoul of the 14th amendment equal protection clause.
141. UPA § 703, cmt. (2002).
142. The reporter for the revised UPA noted that "issues relating to same-sex couples
were left to another day." Sampson, supra note 138, at 3. This is not entirely accurate.
Section 106 reads, "The provisions of this Act relating to the determination of paternity
apply to determination of maternity." The comment that follows notes that much of the Act
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however, the legal mainstream acknowledged such families and extended their
children the same safeguards available to children with heterosexual parents. In
2008, the American Bar Association approved a Model Act Governing Assisted
Reproductive Technology (ABA Model Act). Section 603 reads:
An individual who.., consents to assisted reproduction by a woman as
provided in [this Act with the intent to be a parent of her child is a parent of
the resulting child. 14
The ABA Model Act thus explicitly creates parentage in the partner of a
lesbian who gives birth.
Although the Uniform Parentage Act has not been revised since 2002,
another uniform act, the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), was amended in 2008
to recognize parentage for a lesbian partner. According to section 2-120(f) of
the Uniform Probate Code:
[A] parent-child relationship exists between a child of assisted reproduction
and an individual other than the birth mother who consented to assisted
reproduction by the birth mother with intent to be treated as the other parent of
the child. 144
The comments to this section explicitly reference same-sex couples and
state that by its operation a woman who is not the birth mother becomes the
child's parent.
The Uniform Probate Code affects wills and intestate succession, and
therefore its definition of parent-child relationship applies only in that context.
To date, Colorado and North Dakota have adopted these amendments, 141 which
means that a child born using donor insemination to a lesbian couple in those
states inherits from his or her nonbiological mother. That child will also qualify
as a child of the nonbiological mother for purposes of benefits that extend
eligibility to those defined by state law as able to inherit by intestate
succession. 146
does not logically apply to the establishment of maternity, but it concludes that "in an actual
case, a judge facing a claim for the determination of the mother-child relationship should
have little difficulty deciding which portions of the Act should be applied." UPA § 106, cmt.
(2002). Indeed, it was a similar provision that allowed the California court in Elisa B. to
extend the "holding out" basis for determining parentage to a mother's female partner. Elisa
B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 666 (Cal. 2005), supra Part II.B.i. If a state enacts both
Section 106 and Section 703 of the 2002 UPA, Section 703 should confer maternity on the
consenting female partner of a woman who conceives through assisted conception.
143. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY § 603 (2008)
[hereinafter ABA MODEL ACT] (emphasis added), available athttp://www.abanet.org/
family/committees/artmodelact.pdf.
144. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f) (2008) [hereinafter UPC].
145. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19(6) (2009); An Act Concerning Changes to the
Colorado Probate Code, ch. 310, 2009 Colo. Sess. Laws 1670.
146. One such example is Social Security child insurance benefits. See supra text
accompanying note 53.
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The significance of this change to the Uniform Probate Code goes beyond
its limited subject area. Both the Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform
Parentage Act go through the same NCCUSL process before being
promulgated, including section-by-section consideration at two annual
meetings by the over 300 Commissioners sitting as a Committee of the Whole.
Then a majority of states present, no fewer than twenty, must approve the act
before it can be officially adopted. 147
That process has now produced a definition of parentage consistent with
the gender-neutral formulation in the ABA Model Act. This understanding of
parentage, therefore, reflects a level of approval among the mainstream of the
legal profession that should support state advocacy groups seeking reform. It
should also reassure state legislators that the time has come, as New Mexico
and the District of Columbia have already determined, to acknowledge the
families formed by lesbian couples and their children.
c. Proof of consent
The uniform and model acts discussed above include two methods of
establishing a partner's consent to the insemination with the intent to parent.
The 2002 Uniform Parentage Act requires that the consent be in writing signed
by both the man and the woman. 148 The gender-neutral ABA Model Act says
that "consent by an individual who intends to be a parent of a child born by
assisted reproduction must be in a signed record." 149 The Uniform Probate
Code also uses the word "individual."
' 150
All three acts recognize the reality that a couple will not always sign a
written consent. The law needs a mechanism for adjudicating consent and
intent, and thereby parentage, independent of such a writing. The UPA and
Model ABA Act permit a finding of parentage, in the absence of a writing, if
the two people 151 live with the child and hold the child out as their own "during
the first two years of the child's life.
152
147. For the procedures of NCCUSL, see http://www.nccusl.org/Update/Desktop
Default.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid= 11.
148. UPA § 704a (2002).
149. ABA MODEL ACT § 604(1) (2008).
150. UPC § 2-120(f) (2008) ("Consent to assisted reproduction by the birth mother
with intent to be treated as the other parent of the child is established if the individual: (1)
before or after the child's birth, signed a record that, considering all the facts and
circumstances, evidences the individual's consent ... ").
151. The UPA refers to the "man and woman." UPA § 704b. The ABA Model Act
refers to the "woman and the intended parent." ABA MODEL ACT § 604(2).
152. See UPA § 204(a)(5) (2002); ABA MODEL ACT § 604(2). The general UPA
presumption of paternity extends to a man who lives with a child and holds that child out as
his own "for the first two years of the child's life." UPA § 204(a)(5) (2002). The drafters
explicitly intended that the presumption kick in only alter the child's second birthday. UPA
§ 204 cmt. (2002) The use of the word "during" rather than "for" in the ART context
Oct. 2009]
238 STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS& CIVIL LIBERTIES [V: 2
The UPC contains a slightly different formulation. It establishes consent in
the absence of a signed record if the individual "functioned as a parent of the
child no later than two years after the child's birth," defined as:
[B]ehaving toward a child in a manner consistent with being the child's parent
and performing functions that are customarily performed by a parent,
including fulfilling parental responsibilities toward the child, recognizing or
holding out the child as the individual's child, materially participating in the
child's upbringing, and residing with the child in the same household as a
regular member of that household. 153
But it also finds a parent-child relationship if the person "intended to
function as a parent of the child no later than two years after the child's birth
but was prevented from carrying out that intent by death, incapacity, or other
circumstances." 154 This latter provision is especially important in the context of
inheritance as it establishes a means to secure a child's right to inherit if the
partner dies before the child's birth, even if the couple had no written consent.
The gender- and marital status-neutral version of the Uniform Parentage
Act adopted in New Mexico contains the reference to the child's first two
years. 155 The D.C. statute omits this. If the couple lives with the child and
openly holds the child out as their own, then the court can find the requisite
intent and therefore parentage. This is the correct result because parentage
flows from the consent to the insemination with the intent to parent. The
written consent is the best form of evidence to prove intent, but it is the intent
that properly results in the legal consequences of parenthood.
156
d. Registering both parents on the child's birth certificate
A birth certificate is ordinarily the official record of a child's parentage.
While it is only evidence of parentage, not definitive proof, it is the one piece
suggests that legal parenthood attaches to the conduct of living with/holding out the child at
any time before the child's second birthday.
153. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-115 (2008).
154. Id. § 2-120(f)(2)(B).
155. "Failure of a parent to sign a consent required by Subsection A of this section
does not preclude a finding of parentage if the parent, during the first two years of the child's
life, resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the child as the
parent's own." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, ch. 215 § 7-704(B), 2009 N.M. LAWS 215 (2009).
156. See Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009),
discussed supra text accompanying notes 70-72. In Charisma R, the court refused to read
into the parentage statute a minimum duration of receiving the child into one's home and
holding the child out as one's own. Professor Courtney Joslin advocates a presumption of
consent when the two people "were living an interdependent life together at the time of
conception." Joslin, Assisted Reproductive Technology, supra note 132, at 68. Professor
Joslin lists a number of factors a court could consider in determining whether the couple
lived an interdependent life together. Drafters of the D.C. legislation did not discuss such a
provision, and it does merit consideration.
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of commonly accepted evidence. 157 Statutory reform recognizing the parentage
of the consenting partner of a woman who gives birth using donor insemination
should be accompanied by a provision mandating that the name of the second
parent appear on the child's birth certificate.
The District of Columbia amended its law governing birth certificates in
this fashion. A partner's name goes on the birth certificate as long as the couple
has signed a written consent to the insemination with the intent to parent. 158
Written consent can occur after the child's birth, so that if the couple seeks a
birth certificate with both names but did not sign a consent form before the
child's birth, they can be instructed to sign one at that time. Thus, the couple
does not need to go to court to ensure that the child's birth certificate accurately
reflects the child's legal parents. Birth certificate in hand, in conformity with
the underlying statutory framework, the child will have two parents without the
need for adoption by the nonbiological mother.
The New Mexico statute makes no provision for the issuance of a birth
certificate with the name of a female partner who consents to a woman's
insemination. This oversight should be addressed through regulation or agency
practice so that lesbian couples in New Mexico do not need a judge's order to
obtain of a birth certificate with both names listed as parents. An attorney with
a gay and lesbian family law practice in Albuquerque reports that New Mexico
has recently decided that it will issue a birth certificate with two women's
157. In every state, after an adoption, the appropriate agency issues a new birth
certificate. Lawyers for same-sex couples in some states do report difficulty in obtaining a
new birth certificate after a second-parent or joint adoption. In Virginia, a split decision from
the state's supreme court required the state registrar to issue a new birth certificate after a
second-parent adoption was granted in another state. Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 611 S.E.2d
366 (Va. 2005). The court ruled that the statute on amending a birth certificate after adoption
contained mandatory language. In 2008, a U.S. District Court judge in Louisiana ordered
that state to issue a new birth certificate for a child born there who had been jointly adopted
by a gay male couple in New York. Adar v. Smith, 591 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. La. 2008). The
state refused to issue the new birth certificate because the attorney general had concluded it
violated public policy to allow two unmarried people to jointly adopt. The state has appealed
the District Court ruling. See American Civil Liberties Union of Alabama, ACLU Urges
Federal Appeals Court to Require Louisiana to Issue Birth Certificate to Adopted Child of
Gay Couple, July 7, 2009, http://www.laaclu.org/newsArchive.php?id=344#n344. In Texas,
state law permits only the name of a female mother and a male father to appear on a child's
birth certificate after an adoption. In April 2009, the legislature held a hearing on a bill that
would repeal the gender-specific language. See Equality Texas, http://www.equalitytexas.
org/content.aspx?id=593/; seegenerallyJOSLN & MINTER, supra note 56, § 5:30.
158. The statute reads: "If the mother was not married or in a domestic partnership at
the time of either conception or birth, or between conception and birth, the name of the other
parent shall only be entered on the certificate if:... The parents have signed a consent to
parent a child born by artificial insemination pursuant to § 16-909(e) and paragraph (3A) of
this subsection." See D.C. CODE § 7-205(e)(3) (2001). Section 7-205(e)(3A) of the statute
requires the Vital Records Registrar to furnish a form to the couple requiring, among other
things, notarized consent and written notice that the legal consequences of parenthood arise
from signing the form. Id. § 7-205(e)(3A).
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names when the couple has married in a state that permits same-sex marriage
and presents documentation that there is no other legal parent. 159 This suggests
that the state will be open to instituting an appropriate procedure for recording
the parentage of both mothers of a child born of donor insemination.
The omission of birth certificate law reform in New Mexico was likely a
byproduct of the circumstances that produced the state's parentage law. The
new donor insemination parentage provisions became law in the context of
adopting a version of the 2002 Uniform Parentage Act, and the UPA is silent
on birth certificates. The model law on birth certificates comes not from
NCCUSL or the ABA but from the National Center for Health Statistics at the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
The Model State Vital Statistics Act and Regulations was last revised in
1992, long before any state recognized two same-sex parents in the absence of
an adoption decree. 16 A working group is now in the early stages of a new
revision of this model act. 16  That revision should include language
guaranteeing that when substantive law makes a same-sex couple the parents of
a child born to one of them then the resulting birth certificate accurately records
that information. The new D.C. statute can serve as an example of how states
can implement such a law.
2. The status of a known semen donor
When insemination occurs using semen from an unknown donor, a statute
creating parentage for the lesbian partner who consents to the insemination
with the intent to parent resolves all issues of parentage. The child has two
mothers, and they are the child's only parents.
When there is an identifiable semen donor, other issues may arise.
Lesbians may choose a known donor to have maximum control over who the
child's other genetic parent will be, to afford the child the opportunity to know
that person at a later date, or to avoid the costs associated with using unknown
donor semen from a doctor or sperm bank. Sometimes there is the expectation
that the donor will play some role in the child's life. Because a dispute can later
arise among the parties, a comprehensive parentage law must address the legal
status of a known donor.
159. E-mail from N. Lynn Perls, Attorney in Albuquerque, N.M., to author (Feb. 16,
2009, 13:37) (on file with author).
160. The model act is available online at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/misc/
mvsact92b.pdf.
161. Conversation with Julia Kowaleski, Office of the Director, Division of Vital
Statistics, June 30, 2009.
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a. Not a parent absent written agreement
Many states address the status of a semen donor, but older laws limit their
application to circumstances in which a doctor is involved in the insemination,
and some apply only when the recipient is a married woman. 162 Both these
limitations were removed in the 2000 and 2002 revisions of the Uniform
Parentage Act. 163 Just as the status of a biological mother's partner should not
turn on whether the couple is married or in a civil union or domestic
partnership, neither should that of a semen donor.
Many current donor statutes apply to both married and unmarried
recipients, and they divide into two models. In thirteen states, a donor is not a
parent. 164 There is no distinction between known and unknown donors and no
statutory mechanism for producing a different result even if the parties intend a
different outcome. 165 This model reflects the vast majority of donor
162. The original UPA limited the donor insemination provisions to circumstances in
which a doctor was involved in the insemination and the recipient was married: "If, under
the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife is
inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated
in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived .... The donor of semen
provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a married woman other
than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby
conceived." UPA §§ 5(a)-(b) (1973). This provision reflected the common circumstances
that the procedure was used primarily by a married couple who sought medical help with
infertility and ultimately used semen from an unknown donor to compensate for the
husband's infertility. Because the 1973 provision exists in many current statutes, when a
lesbian uses a known donor the legal status of the donor can depend entirely upon whether a
doctor was involved in the insemination. In Jhordan C. v. MaryK, an early case concerning
a lesbian couple's use of donor semen, the mother could not prevail in her argument that the
donor was not a father because conception took place without the use of a physician. 224
Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986).
163. See UPA § 702, cmt. (2002) ("UPA (1973) § 5(b) specified that a male donor
would not be considered the father of a child born of artificial insemination if the sperm was
provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a married woman other
than the donor's wife. The new Act does not continue the requirement that the donor provide
the sperm to a licensed physician").
164. ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 9-10-201 to -202 (2009); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West
2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (West 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-774 to -
775 (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14 (West 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5405
(LexisNexis 2009); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/2, 40/3 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3111.95 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.239 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7813-15-702
(2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(A)(3) (2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.705 (2009); WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West 2009). In five of these states-Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Illinois and Wisconsin-the insemination statute applies only when a physician is involved
in the insemination. In 2008, California amended its statute so that it would likewise apply in
instances where the man gave his semen to a sperm bank. Act of Sept. 28, 2008, ch. 534,
2008 Cal. Stat. 93 (codified at CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2009)).
165. At least one court, however, has held that a donor nonpaternity provision was
inapplicable when the donor was known to the recipient. See JOSLIN & MINTER, supra note
56, § 3:17.
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insemination situations. It ensures both that the man cannot be looked to for
financial support and that the woman can raise the child in a household free
from disruption caused by a dispute over parentage.
Eight states, however, present a better model. In those states, the donor is
166
not a parent unless the donor and recipient agree in writing to the contrary.
This makes it possible for the two participants to memorialize their intent that
the donor will in fact be a father to the child. This is the choice made in the
D.C. statute. If the donor and the recipient plan to raise the child together but
do not put this in writing, the donor is still a parent if he and the recipient live
together with the child and hold the child out as their own.167
The statutory framework that makes a donor not a parent absent written
agreement was approved by the Kansas Supreme Court in the 2007 case, In re
KM.H. 168 Kansas has such a statute, and a known donor sought paternity of
twins even though he and the children's mother had no written agreement. The
donor asserted the existence of an oral agreement that he would be a parent and
argued that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him.
The court upheld the statute. It reviewed numerous other court challenges
by known donors and distinguished this case from those in states whose laws
contained an absolute bar on a donor's paternity. The Kansas statute was
constitutional because it did recognize a donor as a parent if the parties so
agreed. The requirement that the agreement be in writing enhanced
"predictability, clarity, and enforceability" and encouraged early resolution of
the donor's status. "Encouraging careful consideration of entry into parenthood
is admirable," the court wrote. "Avoidance of the limbo in which [the donor]
finds himself is a worthy legislative goal."
' 169
The court found that requiring the agreement in writing did not make the
166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-702 to -704 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1114(f)
(West 2008); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:11, 168-13:12 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-
44 (West 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-20-60 to
-62 (2008); TEx. FAm. CODE §§ 160.702, 160.7031 (Vernon 2007); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-
2-902 to -904 (2008). In five of these states-Kansas, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, and Texas-the statute applies only when a doctor is involved in the insemination.
In Mntz v Zoernig, 198 P.3d 861, 863 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008), a man donated semen directly
to a lesbian, who bore two children. Although the parties agreed he would have no financial
obligation to the children, the mother subsequently did file for child support. Because the
semen had not been provided to a licensed physician, the statute stating that he was not a
father did not apply. The court acknowledged the possibility that a sperm donor might agree
to relinquish any parental rights or responsibilities, but in this case, because the donor had
visitation with the children and was registered in the vital statistics bureau as the children's
father, he could not avoid his obligation to support them. The 2000/2002 UPA and the
Model ABA Act eliminate the requirement of physician involvement. New Mexico has
amended its statute to remove the requirement of physician involvement, effective January 1,
2010. 2009 N.M. A.L.S. 215, §§ 7-703, 7-704.
167. D.C. CODE § 16-909(e) (2001).
168. 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007).
169. Id. at 1039-40.
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statute unconstitutional. Rather, the statute "ensures no attachment of parental
rights to sperm donors in the absence of a written agreement to the contrary; it
does not cut off rights that have already arisen and attached." 170 Both the
majority and the concurrence noted that the statute appropriately protected a
donor from obligations towards a child absent the required written agreement.
b. Can a child have more than two parents?
Three legal parents are unusual, but not unheard of. One of the first
"second-parent" adoptions ever granted was actually a third-parent adoption. In
1985, an Alaska judge granted an adoption to the mother's partner without
terminating the parental rights of the child's biological father. 171 Other such
adoptions have been granted in Alaska as well as in Massachusetts and
Washington. 172 A California lawyer reports that she has obtained "second-
parent" adoptions without terminating a biological father's rights, but that she
does not bring such cases unless the child is at least five years old, the child
considers all the adults parents, and there is a solid pattern of effective co-
parenting. 173 The recently enacted Delaware statute makes it possible for a
court to declare that a child with two parents has a third parent who meets
certain statutory criteria. 174
Two recent reported cases leaving a child with three parents have also
received substantial attention. In AA v B.B., an Ontario court used its
equitable powers to decree a five-year-old boy's nonbiological mother a legal
parent. 175 The two biological parents both retained their parental status. In
Jacob v Shultz-Jacob, a Pennsylvania appeals court approved a ruling giving a
biological mother and her former partner shared legal custody of their
children. 176 The biological mother received primary physical custody, with
partial physical custody to the other mother. The semen donor, who had been
involved in the children's lives, received partial physical custody and was
ordered to pay child support. There are also several cases of heterosexual
170. Id. at 1041.
171. See Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers, supra note 1, at 522-23
(discussing In re Adoption ofA O.L, in which an adoption order explicitly left the child with
three legal parents: two mothers, who primarily raised her, and a father, who had some
limited contact with her).
172. E-mail from Joyce Kauffman, Attorney, Law Office of Joyce Kauffman, to author
(Jan. 30, 2009, 13:10) (on file with author); E-mail from Allison Mendel, Attorney, Mendel
and Associates, to author (Jan. 31, 2009, 16:35) (on file with author); E-mail from Julie
Shapiro, Professor of Law, Seattle University Law School, to author (Jan. 30, 2009, 13:32)
(on file with author).
173. E-mail from Deborah Wald, Attorney, Wald Law Group, to author (Jan. 30, 2009,
12:01) (on file with author).
174. See discussion supra Part I.B.4.
175. (2007) 83 O.R. 3d 561 (Can.).
176. 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. 2007)
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families not involving assisted conception where the court has allocated the
rights and responsibilities of parenthood among more than two parents. 
177
In recent years, a number of scholars have considered the question of
whether a child can have three parents. 178 After in-depth research, Professor
Susan Appleton concluded that family law is already well-equipped to
recognize multiple parents. 179 "Parenting plans," now a common feature of
divorces, subdivide and assign numerous aspects of parenting. The Missouri
statutory framework, for example, requires parents to specify time with each
person, including every weekday, weekend day, holiday, and vacation; the time
and place of transfers; responsibility for transportation; telephone access times;
how extracurricular activity decisions and educational, medical, and dental
decisions will be made; how child care providers will be chosen; how disputes
will be resolved; and how each distinct category of the child's expenses will be
paid for. 180 "With so many discrete elements of 'parenting' listed," Professor
Appleton concludes, "a plan could easily accommodate two, three, or more
parents." 181
By the time D.C. enacted its parentage act, the jurisdiction had already
recognized that more than two persons may have a right to custody or visitation
177. Louisiana has recognized dual paternity since Smith v. Cole, 553 So.2d 847 (La.
1989). See also Geen v. Geen, 666 So.2d 1192 (La. App. 1995). In J.RZ v. L.R, the child's
nonbiological father, who had raised the child for almost ten years, and the child's biological
father who had no relationship with the child, were both ordered to pay child support. 902
A.2d 261 (N.J. Super. 2006).
178. See, e.g., Laura Nicole Althouse, Three's Company? How American Law Can
Recognize a Third Social Parent in Same-Sex Headed Families, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.
171 (2008); Nancy E. Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J.L. & FAM. STuD. 231
(2007); Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and
Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309 (2007). Professor
Brian Bix has rebuked conservative commentators who respond to the possibility of multiple
parenthood with "bogeyman" arguments such as "once we cross the border into legalized
multiple parenthood, we have virtually arrived at the abolition of marriage and the family."
Brian Bix, The Bogeyman of Three (or More) Parents, U. OF MINN. L. SCH. LEGAL STUD.
RES. PAPER SERIES No. 08-22, available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract1 196562. Bix concludes:
The slippery slope and the parade of horrors are standard forms of
argument, both inside law and elsewhere. However, as often as not, the
horrors never come, or, when they do, they turn out to be not so horrible.
Whether multiple parenting is a good idea, either as a social reality or as
a legal possibility, is, at best, a difficult question, and one that comes up
as often with more conventional family forms, like step-parents, as with
the more unconventional family forms that seem to be evoking the
visceral reaction of some commentators. I hope that we can address these
issues (as a number of academic writers already are) in a more
considered manner, rather than in a full bogeyman panic.
Id. at 8.
179. Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REv. 11(2009)
[hereinafter Appleton, Numbers].
180. Id. at 25.
181. Id.
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with a child and a support obligation towards that child. D.C. recognizes "de
facto" parents by statute. A de facto parent is one:
(A) Who:
(i) Lived with the child in the same household at the time of the child's
birth or adoption by the child's parent;
(ii) Has taken on full and permanent responsibilities as the child's
parent; and
(iii) Has held himself or herself out as the child's parent with the
agreement of the child's parent or, if there are 2 parents, both
parents; or
(B) Who:
(i) Has lived with the child in the same household for at least 10 of the
12 months immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or
motion for custody;
(ii) Has formed a strong emotional bond with the child with the
encouragement and intent of the child's parent that a parent-child
relationship form between the child and the third party;
(iii) Has taken on full and permanent responsibilities as the child's
parent; and
(iv) Has held himself or herself out as the child's parent with the
agreement of the child's parent, or if there are 2 parents, both
parents. 182
A person who can prove that she or he is a de facto parent by clear and
convincing evidence has a right to seek custody or visitation and an obligation
to pay child support on the same basis as a legal parent. 183 Under these statutes,
a child may have two legal parents plus a de facto parent who obtains visitation
rights.
The new D.C. parentage statute could result in three parents for a child. A
lesbian couple may sign a written document stating consent to insemination and
an intent that both will parent. And the couple could also sign an agreement
with the donor that he will be a parent. The statute conclusively establishes the
partner as a parent. The agreement with the donor means that he, too, is a
parent. The statute does not contain a means to choose one person over the
other as the child's only other parent. Should such a case arise, the court should
find that the child has three parents.
The D.C. statute is silent on the legal status of an agreement signed with
the donor that contemplates a role in the child's life but explicitly eschews
182. D.C. CODE § 16-831.01 (2001).
183. Id. § 16-831.03. Until the passage of the new D.C. parentage law, de facto parent
status was the only mechanism for protecting the relationship between a child and a legally
unrecognized parent. This status will still be important because it will protect that
relationship when one mother has adopted a child or when the couple establishes their
relationship after conception. In addition, this status protects a child's relationship with a
legally unrecognized father when a gay male couple has a child using a surrogate mother.
See supra note 46 for the explanation of why the new D.C. parentage law does address such
children.
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parental rights. A court should not find that the donor is a parent absent specific
language to that effect in the agreement. It should, however, enforce provisions
concerning contact with the child.
Elsewhere I have argued that the law should facilitate a family form in
which a child has two legal mothers but also has a legally protected relationship
with a semen donor that falls short of legal parenthood.184 Legal recognition of
such a family form is important because it reflects a common arrangement that
lesbian couples make with a donor. All parties agree at the outset that the man
should have a relationship with the child, but that he will not have parental
rights. That arrangement is vulnerable in most places because, if a dispute
arises, a court is likely to find either that the donor is a parent and has full
rights, or that he is not a parent and therefore has no rights.
The result of enforcing an agreement for visitation rights will be similar to
the arrangement authorized by D.C.'s de facto parent statute-a child with two
parents and another person with visitation rights. A court need not enforce the
exact visitation terms, as the contours of the visitation should serve the child's
best interests. What the court should not do, however, is interpret the writing as
an agreement for full parentage or decline to recognize the donor as entitled to
claim any visitation rights at all.
3. Summing up the status of children born using donor insemination to
lesbian couples in the District of Columbia
The time has come to update state statutes to reflect the families formed by
lesbian couples who have a child through assisted reproduction with donor
semen. The District of Columbia has taken the lead. Its legislation establishes
the parentage of both mothers, confirms the nonparentage of the donor in the
absence of a written agreement, and provides for proper registration of the
child's parents at birth. The District of Columbia allows the couple to register
as domestic partners, but the status of a couple is distinct from their status as
parents. The nonbiological mother's legal status depends solely upon the
couple's intention towards the child as reflected in their written consent or their
behavior. Also, the District of Columbia permits second-parent adoption, 185 but
a woman whose partner bears a child conceived through donor insemination no
longer must pursue that time-consuming and potentially costly method of
establishing her legal status. 186
184. This can be accomplished in states that allow agreements for visitation after a
second-parent adoption terminates any parental rights a donor might have. See Polikoff,
Deliberate Construction, supra note 126.
185. SeeIn re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995).
186. For a discussion of extraterritorial recognition of parentage and the value of
nonetheless obtaining a court judgment establishing parentage, see in/Ia Part V.
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B. Presumptive Parentage
Ten states and the District of Columbia have extended (or are set to extend)
the "marital" parentage presumption to same-sex couples in the formalized
relationship of marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership. 187 Indeed, gay
marriage advocates often invoke protection of the relationship between a child
and both of her same-sex parents as a reason for allowing same-sex couples to
marry. But presumptive parentage without further law reform produces an
unacceptable amount of legal uncertainty.
The parentage presumption, by definition, gets a biological mother's
female spouse or domestic/civil union partner a legal status identical to that
which a biological mother's husband gets. If the state has an assisted
conception statute limited to married couples, the provisions of the statute will
apply to married/domestically partnered/civil unioned lesbian couples when
conception occurs through donor insemination. But when a state has no statute
on assisted conception, and when, in all states, conception occurs through
sexual intercourse, 188 the parentage presumption is inadequate unless
accompanied by legislation settling when, by whom, and on what basis the
presumption can be rebutted. Of the eleven jurisdictions that have, or are about
to have, the parentage presumption, only the District of Columbia
simultaneously rewrote its laws to resolve these issues.
Perhaps these questions would not be so complex if all states were in
agreement as to when, by whom, and on what basis the parentage presumption
can be rebutted in a man who is not the biological parent of his wife's child.
But there is no such uniformity. The matter is addressed, however, in the 2002
Uniform Parentage Act, and that influenced the drafting process in the District
of Columbia.
This Part first examines when and on what basis a lack of biological
connection should be able to rebut the parentage presumption in a biological
mother's female spouse or domestic/civil union partner when there is no
187. For the most recent map of the states affording these means of formal recognition,
see Human Rights Campaign, supra note 47.
188. The circumstances under which conception may occur through sexual intercourse
will vary. The lesbian couple may decide together that one woman will have sexual
intercourse because it is more likely to produce pregnancy than is insemination. Pregnancy
may also occur when one woman has sexual intercourse while under the influence of drugs
or alcohol, when one woman engages in an extramarital relationship with a man, or as a
result of sexual assault. For two examples of cases in which conception occurred through
sexual intercourse, see supra note 110, describing the Quebec case where the nonbiological
mother believed conception was occurring through insemination, and In re Hatzopoulos, 4
Fam. L. Rep. (DNA) 2075 (Denver Juv. Ct. July 8, 1977), in which the child was conceived
through casual sexual intercourse while the lesbian couple was on vacation and, after the
death of the biological mother, a dispute arose between the nonbiological mother and the
sister and brother-in-law of the biological mother. The case is discussed in Polikoff, This
Child Does Have Two Mothers, supra note 1, at 527-29.
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competing claim by an identifiable biological father. It then examines the same
questions when there is such a claim.
In the context of the parentage reform process in D.C., lawyers with the
D.C. Office of the Attorney General (OAG) raised concerns about whether
recognizing a parentage presumption in a mother's female partner would
violate the paternity establishment statutes that affect federal funding of local
child support enforcement efforts. This Part briefly describes the objections put
forth and their ultimate resolution, including explicit approval of the same-sex
domestic partner presumption by the federal Office of Child Support
Enforcement.
1. The biological mother's female spouse/partner
When a married woman bears a child, her husband is the presumptive
father of the child from birth regardless of his biological connection to the
child. Because this status is a derivative of the couple's marriage, it is
appropriate to derive the same status for a lesbian couple who marries or enters
a civil union or domestic partnership. 189 In the new D.C. statute, such a
presumption attaches when the couple is in a domestic partnership at the child's
birth. 190 The partner's name goes on the child's birth certificate. 191
If such a presumption could be rebutted by anyone at any time on the basis
of lack of biological connection between the spouse/partner and the child, then
the presumption would be meaningless for a lesbian couple. 192 A nonbiological
mother would always be able to disestablish her parentage and thereby end her
support obligation, and a biological mother would always be able to
disestablish her partner's parentage, potentially eliminating contact between the
nonbiological parent and her child. 193
189. For an extensive analysis of why the presumption should extend to a lesbian
couple, see Appleton, Presuming Women, supra note 42, at 285-86 ("We can now see the
presumption not as assumption of the husband's probable genetic connection to the child.
Instead, [it] today reflects the belief that someone legally connected to the woman bearing
the child likely planned for the child, demonstrated a willingness to assume responsibility, or
provided support... during the pregnancy, in turn supporting the expected child.")
190. D.C. CODE § 16-909(a)(1) (2001). It also applies if the couple has married in a
jurisdiction that allows same-sex couples to marry. Effective July 7, 2009, the District of
Columbia recognizes such marriages for all purposes. Id. § 46-405.01.
191. Id. § 7-205(e)(2A).
192. Only when a woman gives birth to a child conceived using her partner's egg will
the partner have a biological relationship to the child. See generalyK.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d
673 (Cal. 2005); supra note 83 and accompanying text.
193. A court might apply estoppel principles to avoid such a result. See Kristin H. v.
Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005) (estopping a biological mother who had participated in
obtaining a judgment of parentage for her partner from arguing that the court did not have
the authority to grant the judgment). The nonbiological mother in the District of Columbia
would also likely qualify as a de facto parent. See supra text accompanying notes 182-83.
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In considering the relationship between biology and presumptive
parenthood for lesbian couples, a logical first inquiry is how states, by statute
or court rulings, determine legal parentage when a husband is not the biological
father of his wife's child. In many such instances, men have asked courts to
relieve them of the obligations of legal parenthood. 194 In others, women have
sought declarations of nonpatemity, hoping to eliminate their ex-husbands from
their children's lives. 195 There is no uniformity of outcomes across the country.
The Uniform Parentage Act addresses this matter in the first instance by
establishing a rigid time frame for challenging the parental status of a presumed
father. With very limited exception, an action to adjudicate the parentage of a
child with a presumed father must be brought within two years of the child's
birth. 196 After that time, the presumption cannot be rebutted by anyone. The
drafters admit that this provision deals with "difficult issues." 
197
The District of Columbia accepted the time frame contained in the UPA.
The presumptive parenthood of a male or female spouse or domestic partner of
a woman who gives birth to a child must be challenged before the child's
second birthday. 198 The only exception to this time frame occurs when the
couple did not live together during the 300 days before the birth of the child
and the presumed parent never openly held out the child as his or her own. If
both those criteria are established, a proceeding to disprove the parent-child
relationship may be maintained at any time. 199
The substantive basis for challenging a man's presumed parentage is his
lack of genetic connection to the child.200 The statute allows the court to
nonetheless find that a genetically unrelated husband is a child's parent, even in
the first two years, taking into account the child's interests, whether the conduct
of either the mother or the presumed parent should preclude that party from
denying parentage, and the duration and stability of the relationship between
the child, the presumed parent, and the genetic parent (if there is one).20 1
The basis for rebutting a woman's presumed parentage needs to consider a
fundamental factual distinction. A husband does not always know at the time of
a child's conception that he may not be the child's biological father. For a
lesbian couple, both women know from the moment of pregnancy that the
partner is not the child's biological parent. The decisions the two women make
at that point have consequences for the child and should have legal
194. See Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part 11 Questioning the Paternity of
Marital Children, 37 FAM. L.Q. 55, 58, 64-65 (2003) (detailing statutory and judicial
approaches).
195. Id. at 61 n.23 (detailing cases).
196. UPA § 607(a) (2002).
197. Id. § 607, cmt.
198. D.C. CODE § 16-2342(c) (2001).
199. Id. § 16-2342(d).
200. Id. § 16-909(b)(1).
201. Id. § 16-909(b)(1)(A-C).
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consequences.
A woman whose partner becomes pregnant through sexual intercourse may
not want a parental relationship with the child; the pregnant woman may not
contemplate a parenting role for her partner. On the other hand, the couple may
decide to raise the child as their own.
The D.C. statute addresses this by including an additional basis for
rebutting a female domestic partner's presumed parentage. That presumption
may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that the presumed parent
202did not hold herself out as a parent of the child. With such a provision in
place, neither the state nor the mother would be able to impose a support
responsibility on a partner who never holds the child out as her own.203
If a domestic partner does hold the child out as her own, however, neither
she nor the biological mother would be able to automatically disestablish
parentage on the basis of biology. Rather, the court would weigh the factors of
the child's interest, whether the conduct of either the mother or the presumed
parent should preclude that party from denying parentage, and the duration and
stability of the relationship between the child and the presumed parent. The
court then could find that the partner is the child's legal parent.
A court would be required to interpret the "holding out" standard, and this
is admittedly more subjective than biology. But that language appears in the
original UPA as a basis for determining whether a man is a child's presumed
parent, and it remains in the 2002 UPA. 20 4 Courts have experience with the
standard and should be able to apply it in the circumstance contemplated
here.2 °5
Furthermore, this language approximates the standard that a court must
apply in determining whether a partner who did not consent in writing to a
woman's insemination is the parent of the resulting child. As contained in the
model laws and the D.C. statute, she is a parent if the couple "resided together
in the same household with the child and openly held the child out as their
own., 20 6 From the child's perspective, the functional parental relationships do
not vary with method of conception.
Because rebuttal based on biology would render the presumption
meaningless, and because no rebuttal at all would result in legal parenthood
202. Id. § 16-909(b)(2). This provision applies to a female domestic partner because the
D.C. domestic partnership law is available to different-sex as well as same-sex couples, and
rebuttal of a father-child parentage presumption for a man in a domestic partnership with the
mother is addressed elsewhere. See id. § 16-909(b).
203. Professor Appleton does not explore this issue in depth, but she does consider the
similar possibility of rebutting the presumption when the presumed parent "never performed
any parental functions." Presuming Women, supra note 42, at 291.
204. SeeUPA § 4(4) (1973); UPA § 204 (2002). See also UPA § 204, cmt. (2002).
205. See, e.g., Elisa B. v Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 667 (Cal. 2005) (discussing and
applying the holding out provision to the matter before the court).
206. D.C. CODE § 16-909(e)(1)(B) (2001).
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when it is inappropriate, the standard carved out in the D.C. statute offers a
good solution. States whose laws now contain the parentage presumption need
an additional statute to achieve this result.
2. The biological father
a. Statutory framework
A comprehensive statute establishing a parentage presumption for a
mother's same-sex partner should also address the legal status of the biological
father. When he is a semen donor, a statute that he is not a parent absent an
agreement in writing to the contrary settles the issue. At least two states,
Vermont and Iowa, have the parentage presumption for same-sex couples but
no statute on assisted conception. In all states, if conception occurs through
sexual intercourse, a court may have to resolve competing claims to
parenthood.20 7
A case pending in Vermont raises this issue. 208 A child was born to a
lesbian couple in a civil union using donor insemination with a known donor,
and the couple raised the child together. By virtue of the civil union, both
women are her legal parents. 209 The couple separated, however, and the
biological mother and the known semen donor are together challenging the
parental status of the nonbiological mother.
If Vermont had a statute establishing that a donor of semen to a married
woman is not a parent, or is not a parent without an agreement in writing, that
statute would apply equally to a woman in a same-sex civil union.210 But
Vermont has no donor insemination statute at all. It does, of course, have a
statute that creates a rebuttable presumption that "[a] person alleged to be a
parent" is a parent if the "child is born while the husband and wife are legally
married to each other."
211
There is no explicit statement in the Vermont code as to when a biological
father can rebut a husband's presumptive parentage, and the civil union law
does not answer that question for a civil union partner. Vermont law gives the
family court jurisdiction over actions brought by a person to establish
parentage. 212 An action may be brought by "a person alleged or alleging
207. See supra note 188 for examples of conception by sexual intercourse.
208. Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, CP. v RD., GLAD BRIEFS 11 (Winter
2009), available at http://www.glad.org/current/reports/ (discussing GLAD's representation
of the nonbiological parent in CP. v. RD.).
209. VT. ST. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(f) (2008).
210. See id.
211. Id § 308.
212. Id. § 303.
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himself or herself to be the natural parent of a child., 2 13 A code section does
state that "results of genetic testing are relevant ... in order to prove [or
disprove] parentage," but the court has the power to exempt a party from
genetic testing "for good cause."
' 214
There is no reported Vermont case law on whether and when a biological
parent may claim parentage of a child born to a woman married to another man.
In Godin v. Godin, the significance of biology arose in a different context; the
court refused to allow genetic testing, and consequent paternity
disestablishment, of a child born to a married couple when the challenge was
brought by the former husband years after a divorce decree named him the
father of the child and ordered him to pay child support. 2 15 In other words, the
only guiding case in Vermont falls in the context of a challenge by one of the
spouses, not a claim by the biological father.
If Vermont allows the donor's biological tie to rebut the presumption of
parentage in a nonbiological mother, it will make the presumption virtually
worthless. If the court wants to distinguish based on method of conception, it
will have to use its equitable powers, since there is no donor insemination
21621
statute. A comprehensive statute must address this issue.217
Aware of the need for such statutory guidance, drafters of D.C.'s recent
reforms gave careful consideration to how a court should resolve competing
claims when a child is born to a woman with a male or female spouse or
domestic partner and the child's other biological parent is not that presumed
parent.
Before the most recent statutory changes, D.C. law gave a man claiming
genetic parentage an unlimited opportunity to file an action for legal parentage,
218
even when the mother's husband had always held the child out as his own.
Proof of genetic testing always rebutted the marital presumption. 219 As written,
a D.C. court, if asked, had to disestablish the parentage of a husband and
establish the genetic father as the child's other parent. The disruption to the
child such a finding could provoke counseled in favor of reforming the relevant
law for married heterosexual couples, and then applying the same standard to
same-sex partners/spouses.
213. Id. § 302.
214. Id. § 304(a)-(b).
215. 725 A.2d 904 (Vt. 1998).
216. The Vermont Supreme Court has already demonstrated a willingness to develop
criteria for parentage in the absence of complete statutory guidance. See Miller-Jenkins v.
Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 968-69 (Vt. 2006).
217. If Vermont had the two-year limit on challenges to the legal status of a presumed
parent contained in the UPA, even in the absence of a donor insemination statute, the court
in the pending case would dismiss an action to grant parentage to the biological father, as
long as the child was at least two years old.
218. D.C. CODE § 16-909(b-1)(1), (a)(1) (2001).
219. Id. § 16-909(b-1).
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At one stage in developing the D.C. statute, drafters chose to leave a judge
with maximum discretion to resolve parentage. When a child had a presumed
second-parent because the mother was married or in a domestic partnership, but
another person was the child's genetic parent, the bill would have allowed the
judge to determine legal parentage, "giving due consideration to the child's
interests and the duration and stability of the relationship between the child and
the presumed parent.,
220
During conferences on the D.C. bill, the lawyers in the D.C. OAG
expressed concern that this standard would give a judge too much leeway to
disestablish parentage. Therefore, all involved in the drafting agreed on the
almost absolute two-year limit contained in the UPA, with the possibility that
even within the two-year period a judge could determine that the presumed
parent was indeed the child's legal parent after considering the child's
interest.
221
b. Constitutional considerations
The Supreme Court has imbued a man not married to a child's mother with
constitutional rights with respect to his biological child if he has "grasped the
222opportunity" and developed a relationship with the child. But the man may
not have constitutional parental rights if the child is born to a woman married to
another man and the married couple wants to raise the child as their own.223
This principle stems from the case of Mf'chael H. v Gerald D., in which the
Supreme Court left intact a California law denying a biological father who had
functioned as a father the right to seek paternity of a child born while the
220. DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP JuDIcIAL DETERMINATION OF PARENTAGE ACT OF 2009,
B. 18-0066 (D.C. 2009), as introduced on January 6, 2009, available at
http://www.dccouncil.us/images/00001/20090109130008.pdf. This language was adapted
from a D.C. Court of Appeals case, SA v M.A, 531 A.2d 1246, 1249 n.2 (D.C. 1987).
221. The exact language is as follows:
A [parentage] presumption may be overcome upon proof by clear and convincing evidence,
in a proceeding instituted within the time provided in § 16-2342(c) or (d), that the presumed
parent is not the child's genetic parent. The Court shall try the question of parentage, and
may determine that the presumed parent is the child's parent, notwithstanding evidence that
the presumed parent is not the child's genetic parent, after giving due consideration to (A)
Whether the conduct of the mother or the presumed parent should preclude that party from
denying parentage; (B) The child's interests; and (C) The duration and stability of the
relationship between the child, the presumed parent, and the genetic parent.
D.C. CODE § 16-909(b)(1) (2001). The time frame referred to is within two years of the
child's birth, unless the presumed parent did not live with the child's mother during the 300
days before the child was born and did not hold the child out as his or her own. Id. § 16-
2342(c) and (d). The exception to the two-year rule assures that a spouse or domestic partner
separated from the mother, who never acts as the child's parent, but who does not obtain a
legal dissolution of the relationship, will not be found to be the child's parent.
222. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
223. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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mother was married to another man, when the mother and her husband wished
to raise the child together. 22 In such a factual scenario, states have substantial
discretion in determining the circumstances under which such a genetic father
may challenge the presumed parental status of a mother's husband.
Without further guidance from the Supreme Court, each state has settled
both the constitutional and policy issues in its own way. The variation among
the states confounds the ability to generalize. In some states, only the mother or
her husband can challenge the presumption; in others, rebuttal is permitted if
consistent with the child's interests; and in others, the biological father has a
225
right to challenge the husband's paternity.
For example, an Ohio court ruled that a married couple had a constitutional
right to the integrity of their family. 226 As a result, the court ruled that a statute
giving a man alleging biological fatherhood the right to bring a parentage
action against the couple violated the married couple's constitutional rights.
The court noted that "a family unit, regardless of its composition, is
constitutionally protected." The opinion does not say how old the child was
when the paternity action was filed, but when the case was decided, the child
was seventeen months old. The court did not want to undermine the value of
the child's intact family, and it cited attachment theory and the husband's
psychological parenthood as significant to its ruling.
On the other hand, in In re The Parentage ofJohn M., the Illinois Supreme
Court overturned a lower court ruling that the state's parentage law was
227
unconstitutional on its face. The mother's extra-marital partner had filed a
paternity action and sought genetic testing concerning a child bom while the
mother was still married. The husband argued that the statute was facially
unconstitutional because it did not require a hearing on the child's best interests
before ordering paternity testing. On appeal, the court held that the test of facial
unconstitutionality was not met and that the lack of an evidentiary hearing
made it impossible to rule that the statute was unconstitutional as applied.
In another Illinois case, the appeals court overturned a lower court order
denying genetic testing after holding a "best interests" hearing. 228 The trial
court found that genetic testing would not be in the child's best interests and
dismissed the paternity action filed by a man alleging to be the biological father
of a child born to a married couple. The child was three years old when the
petition was filed. The appeals court held that the alleged biological father had
standing to bring the action, that the statute required the testing on the request
of any party, and that the court could not read into the statute consideration of
224. Id.
225. See Appleton, Presuming Women, supra note 42, at 234-36 nn.31-37 (detailing
cases from various jurisdictions dealing with rebuttals of parental presumptions).
226. Merkel v. Doe, 63 Ohio Misc. 2d (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1993).
227. 817 N.E.2d 500 (Ill. 2004).
228. J.S.A. v. M.H., 797 N.E.2d 705 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
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the child's interests in deciding whether to order the testing. In the absence of a
specific statutory provision, the court ruled, "[t]he law, as it exists today, fails
to protect the child's best interests in parentage determinations."
' 229
The District of Columbia has decided that when a child is born to a couple
in a marriage or a domestic partnership, a biological father may bring a
parentage action before the child's second birthday. The court then determines
legal parentage. The court must consider the child's interests and "the duration
and stability of the relationship between the child, the presumed parent, and the
genetic parent." 230 This framework is generally derived from the 2002 Uniform
Parentage Act, which also cuts off a biological father's claim once the child is
two years old and which allows a judge to reject an action even within the first
two years based on specified criteria. 231 The Constitution mandates nothing
more.
c. Concluding thoughts on two guiding principles
States that have extended the marital parentage presumption to same-sex
spouses/partners need gender-neutral and marital status-neutral assisted
conception statutes.232 They also need to revisit their parentage statutes and
make an explicit decision about when biology will be permitted to trump the
child's intact family unit.
While there are clearly a number of approaches that a state can take to
determine the parentage of a child conceived through sexual intercourse outside
the marriage or domestic partnership, two principles should remain constant.
When a child has a presumed parent, through a mother's different-sex or same-
sex marriage or through a civil union or domestic partnership, biology should
not be an automatic basis for assigning parentage when doing so would
disestablish a spouse's or partner's parentage. In addition, the legal standard for
choosing biology over the intact, formally recognized family unit should be the
same whether that unit is a marriage, a civil union, or a domestic partnership.
The District of Columbia approach incorporates both of these principles.
3. The impact of federal law
While family law is overwhelmingly a matter left to states, for more than
two decades federal statutes and regulations have structured the way states
establish and collect child support. There is a body of law that states must enact
229. Id. at 709.
230. D.C. CODE § 16-909(b)(1)(B)-(C) (2001).
231. UPA §§ 607-608 (2002). In the UPA, the principle that the judge can reject
disestablishment of paternity even before the child's second birthday takes the form of
authorizing the judge to deny a motion for genetic testing filed in the first two years.
232. See supra Part W.A.
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in order to receive federal funding for their child support enforcement
programs. During discussions on the pending D.C. legislation, attorneys with
the D.C. Office of the Attorney General raised the possibility that a
presumption of parentage in a mother's female domestic partner might run
afoul of federal requirements geared towards determinations of paternityfor all
children born "out of wedlock.,
233
OAG lawyers hypothesized that the federal government would not
recognize parentage in a mother's domestic partner because of the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA) and that a child support agency would therefore be
required to establish a child's paternity. Any laws to the contrary of such a
requirement, they said, might put the District of Columbia out of compliance
with federal law and at risk of losing the federal funding for its child support
enforcement program. OAG therefore sent the proposed legislation to the
federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) for review.
234
The federal child support enforcement laws, when enacted, did not
expressly contemplate a child born to two parents, both mothers. Nonetheless, a
California county pursued Elisa B. for child support when her former partner
began receiving public assistance, and the court ordered her to support the child
that she and the biological mother planned for and raised together.2 3 5 Laws
with a parentage presumption for a mother's domestic/civil union partner or
same-sex spouse actually create legal parents with obligations to support their
children. In that way they are consistent with the goals of the federal scheme.
DOMA does not override the power of states to define parentage, and on
236its face, DOMA does not apply to civil unions or domestic partnerships. In a
different context, the federal government has already recognized a parent-child
relationship for a Vermont child and her nonbiological mother who was the
civil union partner of her biological mother. 237 Vermont has had a civil union
233. See42 U.S.C. § 652(g)(2)(A)(i) (2006).
234. The Gay and Lesbian Activists Alliance of Washington has placed some of the
correspondence among the D.C. OAG, the federal OCSE, and supporters of the parentage
law reform on its website. The letters can be found at: http://www.glaa.org/archive/2008/
OAG2MendelsonO7lO.html; http://www.glaa.org/archive/2008/polikoffrefutesoagO724.pdf;
http://glaa.org/archive/2008/hhsonarentagebill1O03.pdf, http://glaa.org/archive/2008/
polikoffonparentagebill107.pdf; http://glaa.org/archive/2009/nickles2mendelsonond
pparentagebill0316.pdf; http://glaa.org/archive/2009/nclr2fentyO3l9.pdf, http://glaa.org/
archive/2009/ocseondpparentagebilO33 1.pdf; and http://glaa.org/archive/2009/nickles
endorsesparentagebill0403.pdf.
235. Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 669 (Cal. 2005).
236. See JOSLIN & MINTER, supra note 56, § 6:09 ("To date, every court that has
considered the question has held that civil unions and registered domestic partnerships, while
providing many rights and responsibilities of marriage, are not 'treated as a marriage' within
the meaning of the federal DOMA.")
237. A Department of Justice Memorandum Opinion found that recognizing the legal
relationship between the parent and child for purposes of the child's eligibility for Social
Security benefits was not a DOMA violation. See Engel, supra note 53.
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parental presumption since 2000. No state that has recognized the parental
status of a biological mother's same-sex spouse or partner has ever been
threatened with loss of federal funding.
The federal government has no interest in withholding child support
enforcement funding from states. Its interest is in a well-functioning system
that facilitates collection of child support from parents; federal funding
necessarily helps such systems operate. Recognition of parentage for lesbian
couples has not adversely affected states that permit such recognition, and the
federal government is well-positioned to adapt to the definitions of parentage
that emerge from assisted reproduction and parentage presumptions for same-
sex couples.
In spite of the arguments set forth by advocates of the revision of D.C.
parentage laws, the D.C. OAG continued to oppose the bill. After the D.C. City
Council Committee on Public Safety and the Judiciary voted favorably on the
bill, the OAG sent a copy to the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement
and urged that the Council not take further action until the receiving an opinion
from the agency. Advocates for the bill opposed further slowing down the
process of enactment. Both sides were satisfied, however, when OCSE swiftly
replied. Juanita De Vine, OCSE Regional Program Manager, wrote a letter
stating that two changes that had been made in the final bill satisfied their
concerns. 23 8 She concluded:
While it is impossible to conceive of every scenario that might be implicated
238. Letter from Juanita De Vine, OCSE Regional Program Manager, to Peter J.
Nickles, Attorney General for the District of Columbia (Mar. 31, 2009) (on file with author
and online at http://glaa.org/archive/2009/ocseondpparentagebilI0331.pdf). The first change
was unrelated to parentage and concerned a matter related to enforcement of spousal support
orders.
The second change was as follows. Archaically, several D.C. statutes retain use of the
term "out of wedlock." D.C. CODE § 16-907(b) reads: "The term 'born out of wedlock'
solely describes the circumstances that a child has been born to parents who, at the time of
its birth, were not married to each other. The term 'born in wedlock' solely describes the
circumstances that a child has been born to parents who, at the time of its birth, were married
to each other." Bill 18-0066 as introduced amended this so it would read: "The term 'born
out of wedlock' solely describes the circumstances that a child has been born to parents who,
at the time of its birth, were not married to, or in a domestic partnership with, each other.
The term 'born in wedlock' solely describes the circumstances that a child has been born to
parents who, at the time of its birth, were married to, or in a domestic partnership with, each
other." (emphasis added). This amendment to 16-907(b) was removed from the legislation
before its passage. In its place, the law adds a new section as follows: "A child born to
parents in a domestic partnership shall be treated for all legal purposes as a child born in
wedlock." D.C. CODE § 16-907(c) (2001). The OCSE letter cited the removal of the change
to the definition of "born out of wedlock" as sufficiently addressing previously stated
concerns. Advocates for the legislation were satisfied that the new provision achieves the
identical legal result and therefore did not object to the change. Letter from Juanita De Vine,
Regional Program Manager, Department of Health and Human Services, to Peter J. Nickles,
Attorney General, District of Columbia (Mar. 31, 2009), a vailable athttp://glaa.org/archive/
2009/ocseondpparentagebil1033 1.pdf.
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by the change in rights and obligations brought about by the legislation, the
revised bill presents no apparent conflict with Federal requirements for the
Child Support Enforcement program under title IV-D of the Social Security
Act. The Office of Child Support Enforcement does not anticipate compliance
issues for the DC program based on the rights and obligations• 239
acknowledged/created by the proposed legislation.
Advocates of this legislation continue to believe that there was never any
danger that D.C. would lose federal funding for its child support program as a
result of the new parentage rules. Nonetheless, should advocates in other
jurisdictions face similar objections, the OCSE letter approving the changes for
D.C. should satisfy any concerns that may be raised.
V. EXTRATERRITORIAL RECOGNITION OF PARENTAGE
Parentage conferred by state law, whether through a donor insemination
statute or a presumption based on the couple's status, will protect the
relationship between a child and her nonbiological mother under that state's
law. To the extent that the definition of "parent" and "child" under federal law
tracks the law of the state where the family lives, the relationship will also be
recognized for federal law purposes.
Parentage established through a court judgment, whether through an
adoption decree or an order of parentage, is entitled to full faith and credit by
other states. There is by now a substantial body of law that such judgments
must be honored, even when the state would not have issued such a judgment
under its own laws.
240
239. Letter from Juanita De Vine, supra note 238.
240. See, e.g., Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007) (invalidating as a
violation of the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause an Oklahoma law refusing to
recognize same-sex couple adoptions from other states); Russell v. Bridgens, 647 N.W.2d 56
(Neb. 2002) (upholding second-parent adoption from Pennsylvania, even though such an
adoption is unavailable in Nebraska); Embry v. Ryan, 11 So. 3d 408 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App.
2009) (upholding second-parent adoption by mother's lesbian partner in Washington state,
even though such an adoption is prohibited in Florida); Giancaspro v. Congleton, 35 Fam. L.
Rep. (BNA) 1201 (Mich. Ct. App. March 3, 2009) (Michigan must recognize an Illinois
adoption by a same-sex couple even if the adoption would not have been granted in
Michigan). Extensive analytical support for interstate recognition of adoptions by gay men
and lesbians is found in Rhonda Wasserman, Are You Still My Mother? Interstate
Recognition ofAdoptions by Gays and Lesbians, 58 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (2008). Every state is
required by federal law to have a statute that accords full faith and credit to judicial or
administrative determinations of paternity by other states. 42 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(l1) (2006).
Should a state refuse to extend such full faith and credit to a parentage determination when
the parent is a woman rather than a man, that would raise a serious equal protection gender-
based discrimination claim. Some states already explicitly use the word parentage when
referring to the full faith and credit requirement. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-639
(2009); D.C. CODE § 16-909.02 (2001); OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.02 (LexisNexis
2009). For a thorough discussion of other cases and of the legal theories supporting interstate
recognition of parentage orders, see Joslin, Interstate Recognition, supra note 55.
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Because full faith and credit does not extend to the statutes of other states,
however, the nonbiological mother and her child may be vulnerable to losing
their parent-child relationship should the family move to a different state. The
subsequent state may not recognize the validity of the couple's marriage, civil
union, or domestic partnership, and may therefore refuse to recognize a parent-
child relationship arising by operation of law out of the couple's status. A
parent-child relationship created by a gender-neutral, marital status-neutral
donor insemination statute does not require recognition of the couple's legal
status. To that extent, it is a more secure basis for establishing parentage. It is
possible, however, that a subsequent state might attempt to invalidate such a
parent-child relationship as a violation of its own public policy.
This has never happened, but litigation raising the issue is inevitable. This
Part briefly addresses these concerns. Regretfully, I conclude, as do other
commentators, that a couple with the resources to do so should obtain a
judgment of parentage or a second-parent adoption that will offer security
across state lines.
A. Recognition for Federal Law Purposes
DOMA limits the terms "marriage" and "spouse" in federal law,
respectively, to "a legal union between one man and one woman as husband
and wife" and "a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. ' 24 1 In
2007, the Social Security Administration sought an opinion from the Office of
Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice concerning whether DOMA
precluded the award of child insurance benefits (CIB) to the nonbiological
child of the biological mother's Vermont civil union partner.242 The Social
Security Administration sought the opinion from the Department of Justice
because it questioned whether the federal DOMA prohibited federal
recognition of the parent-child relationship arising out of a couple's civil union.
The DOJ opinion found no such bar. Federal law allows a child to receive
CIB if, under state law, the child would inherit as a son or daughter if the parent
were to die intestate. As a result of Vermont's civil union law, the child at issue
met that test. The DOJ opinion concluded that DOMA was not implicated
because "an individual may qualify as a 'child' ... wholly apart from the
existence of any marriage at all, as would be the case of a natural-born child of
an unmarried couple, or as is the case here, where Vermont recognizes a
parent-child relationship outside of the context of marriage. 4 3
241. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
242. Engel, supra note 53.
243. In another, unreported, Social Security child benefits case, the administrative law
judge overturned the initial, DOMA-based, denial of benefits because the parent-child
relationship stemmed not from a marriage but from the nonbiological mother's order of
parentage. See Joslin, Interstate Recognition, supra, note 55, at 597-98 (discussing case). A
child will also qualify for benefits in states that adopt the latest amendments to the Uniform
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When other federal consequences are at stake, the government is likely to
follow the reasoning contained in this opinion by turning to the specific
definition of "parent" and "child" in the federal statute at issue.
Parental status deriving from a gender-neutral and marital status-neutral
insemination statute like that enacted in the District of Columbia raises no
DOMA issue as the status is independent from the couple's relationship to each
other. The child's birth certificate naming both parents pursuant to such a
244
statute should establish the parent-child relationship for all federal purposes.
B. Recognition in Other States
States that grant parental status to both of a child's mothers are likely to
recognize such relationships stemming from the laws of other states. A recent
Massachusetts case illustrates this principle. In 2008, a nonbiological mother,
A.H., filed an action in Massachusetts seeking recognition of parental status
deriving from her California domestic partnership.245 She sought custody of the
Probate Code defining parent-child relationship. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying
text. The DOJ opinion elides in the first instance the question of whether DOMA is of any
relevance to relationships created by civil unions or domestic partnerships, since those
relationships are not "marriage." Many advocates believe it is not. The National Center for
Lesbian Rights (NCLR) appealed a denial of Social Security child benefits for the child of a
disabled worker who had obtained an order of parentage of the child in California. The
denial was based in part on the Defense of Marriage Act. The NCLR brief argued as follows:
As the Ninth Circuit recently held, DOMA applies only to marriages; it does not apply to
domestic partnerships. In Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 683 (9th Cir. 2006), the
court held that two men who were domestic partners in California lacked standing to
challenge DOMA because DOMA applies only to marriages, not to domestic partnerships,
and "a domestic partnership is not by any means a marriage." The court explained:
Section 3 of DOMA is definitional. The word "marriage" and the word
"spouse" are defined for the purposes of federal statutes, rules and
regulations. Marriage, it declares, "means only a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife." It does notpurport to
preclude Congress or anyone else in the federal system #om extending
benefits to those who are not included within that definition.
Id (emphasis added). As Smelt makes clear, DOMA is concerned only with the legal
definition, for federal purposes, of the term "marriage." It does not address domestic
partnership in any way.
NCLR, Sample Brief in Support of Benefts for a Child of an Insured Worker Who Is the
Same-Sex Partner of the Child's Biological or Adoptive Parent5 (n.d.) (on file with author).
On appeal, the Administrative Law Judge agreed. Application of L., Office of Disability
Adjudication and Review, Social Security Administration (Mar. 19, 2007) (copy of decision
on file with author).
244. If the couple establishes a residence in a state that does not recognize the
nonbiological mother as a parent, federal law might assign the legal status that the state of
residence assigns and therefore not recognize the parent-child relationship under federal law.
For a discussion of recognition in other states, see inrra Part V.B.
245. Memorandum of Decision and Order on Parties' Motions, A.H. v. M.R., ES-08D-
2586-CS, ES-08D-2741-DR, ES-08E-0132-QC (Massachusetts Trial Court, Probate and
Family Court Department, Essex Division Feb. 2, 2009) (on file with author).
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couple's fifteen-month-old child, J., after the biological mother, M.R., moved
to Oregon with the child. M.R. filed a motion to dismiss, claiming, among other
things, that A.H. lacked standing to file for custody.
The trial court denied the motion, deeming it
likely that principles of comity, or the requirements of the full faith and credit
clause.., will cause a Massachusetts court to recognize the validity of the
parties' California Registered Domestic Partnership and the rights and duties
flowing therefrom. If such recognition does occur, it appears incontrovertible
that plaintiff would have the same parental rights and obligations with respect
to custody, visitation and support of [J.] as a married spouse would have with
her child.
2 46
A majority of states, however, have enacted some form of a "defense of
marriage" act or constitutional amendment, as authorized by the federal DOMA
which says that states are not required to give effect to "a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws [of another
state]. 24 7 The reach of these acts varies. Some ban only marriage between
same-sex couples; others ban recognition of a broader range of same-sex
relationships, such as civil union and domestic partnership; still others ban
extending legal recognition to unmarried couples, gay or straight.24 The
contours of a legal dispute over interstate recognition of parental status deriving
from the couple's relationship will vary depending on the specific wording of a
state's ban.
In each of the three cases to date challenging the status of a nonbiological
parent, the first court to hear the dispute was in a state willing to extend rights
to the nonbiological parent. Subsequently, the biological parent initiated
proceedings in a different state. That state's court had to rule in the first
instance whether it could hear the merits of the case under state and federal
custody jurisdiction rules. Two of the three cases are pending on appeal, but in
all instances so far the courts have ruled that only a court in the state that first
heard the action could determine the child's custody and visitation.
Only one of these cases involved interstate recognition of a parent-child
relationship deriving from the couple's formalized status. That dispute, Miller-
Jenkins v. Mlf'ler-Jenlins, has had years of litigation, multiple appellate
opinions, and substantial public attention. 249 The couple, Janet and Lisa, lived
246. Id. at 9. The appeals court refused to stay the order awarding A.H. visitation
rights, ruling, among other things, that the principle of comity would result in recognition by
Massachusetts of parental status deriving from the couple's California domestic partnership,
and that therefore the appellant unlikely to win on appeal. M.R. v. A.H., A.C. 09-J-0084
(Mass. App. Mar. 16, 2009) (on file with author).
247. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
248. See Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibitions (June 4, 2009),
http://www.hrc.org/documents/marriageAprohibitions 2009.pdf.
249. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822 (Va. 2008); Miller-Jenkins
v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 955-56 (Vt. 2006); Witt, About Isabella, WASH. POST
MAG., Feb. 4, 2007, at W14.
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in Virginia and, in 2000, traveled to Vermont and entered a civil union. In
2002, Lisa gave birth to a child, I.M.J., after donor insemination. Later that
year, the couple moved with the baby to Vermont. About a year later, the
couple split up and Lisa moved back to Virginia with IMJ. Two months later,
Lisa filed in Vermont for dissolution of the civil union and for custody, with
supervised visitation between the child and Janet. In June 2004, the Vermont
court entered a custody and visitation order in the case.
On July 1, 2004, Lisa filed a petition in Virginia seeking a determination
that she was IMJ's only parent. She argued that Virginia should not recognize
Janet as a parent because of the state's Marriage Affirmation Act and the
federal DOMA. She argued that because Virginia does not recognize a legal
status for same-sex couples, 25 and DOMA does not compel that recognition,
and Janet's status derived from the civil union, the Virginia courts should not
consider Janet to be IMJ's parent.
251
Lisa lost on the basis of Virginia's custody jurisdiction statute and the
federal custody jurisdiction statute, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
(PKPA).252 Both the Virginia and the Vermont courts held that Vermont had
jurisdiction over the case and that Virginia was obligated to give full faith and
credit to Vermont's orders. 253 Neither the Virginia Court of Appeals nor the
Virginia Supreme Court reached the merits of Lisa's argument. Lisa's final loss
in the Virginia Supreme Court came on a procedural ruling about the applicable
"law of the case."
' 2 54
In Prashad v. Copeland, currently pending in the Virginia Court of
Appeals, Prashad, a woman who bore a child as a surrogate mother for a gay
male couple in North Carolina, is arguing that Virginia should not register
custody orders from a North Carolina court to the extent that those orders
confer parental custodial rights on the biological father's partner.25' The trial
250. The language of Virginia's law is very broad. It reads: "A civil union, partnership
contract or other arrangement between persons of the same sex purporting to bestow the
privileges or obligations of marriage is prohibited. Any such civil union, partnership contract
or other arrangement entered into by persons of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction
shall be void in all respects in Virginia and any contractual rights created thereby shall be
void and unenforceable." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2009).
251. AMfiller-JenDns, 661 S.E.2d at 825.
252. Id. at 826-27.
253. Id. at 827.
254. Id. at 826. Lisa Miller, represented by the anti-gay legal group Liberty Counsel,
continues to fight in Virginia against enforcement of the Vermont orders. See Press Release,
Liberty Counsel, Lisa Miller Case with Conflict Between States over Same-Sex Union at
Court of Appeals (Dec. 10, 2009), available at http://www.lc.org/index.cfm?PID=14100&
PRID=885. On November 20, 2009, the Vermont trial judge ordered custody of Isabella
transferred to Janet Jenkins. 36 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1063 (Vt. Fain. Ct. 2009).
255. The North Carolina order was the result of a consent agreement signed by the
three parties awarding primary legal and physical custody to the gay male couple and
secondary legal and physical custody to the surrogate mother. Prashad v. Copeland, JA
2008-77 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 9, 2008) (on file with author). The appeal was argued before the
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court ruled on a motion for summary judgment that North Carolina had
jurisdiction to issue the custody orders and that, as in Mfller-Jenkins, the PKPA
required Virginia to give those orders full faith and credit. Prashad has
appealed, pressing her arguments that, pursuant to Virginia's Marriage
Affirmation Act and Marriage Constitutional Amendment, the North Carolina
orders need not be honored.
The Alabama Supreme Court is currently considering the status of a
nonbiological mother who obtained a California order of parentage and
visitation rights pursuant to the test established by the California Supreme
Court in Elisa B.256 The dispute originated in California one month after the
biological mother, N.B., moved to Alabama with the child. Because California
was still the child's "home state," California had jurisdiction to hear matters
related to the child's custody. Nonetheless, N.B. subsequently began a
proceeding in Alabama, and the trial court ruled that she was the child's only
parent and that A.K. had no right to visitation.257
The Alabama appeals court reversed that trial court ruling, citing ller-
Jenkins for the principle that Alabama lacked jurisdiction to decide the child's
custody or visitation.258 In her brief before the Alabama Supreme Court, N.B.
argues that Alabama properly exercised jurisdiction, that Alabama should not
radically redefine parentage to provide two mothers for a child, and that it is an
unconstitutional infringement of her parental rights to apply Elisa B. to a child
who was born before that opinion was issued.259
AM'ller-Jenlans, Prashad, and NB. raise custody jurisdiction issues. No
court, other than in gay-friendly Massachusetts, has been asked in the first
instance to recognize the legal status of a nonbiological parent created by
another state's statutes, including the marital presumption that extends to a
female spouse or civil union/domestic partner. Because state "defense of
marriage" acts make such recognition uncertain, advocates for same-sex
couples and their children encourage a nonbiological mother to adopt her
child.260
Virginia Court of Appeals on June 16, 2009. Prashad v. Copeland, No. 2609-08-4 (Va. Ct.
App. June 16, 2009). See http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/cav/dockets/Merit Dockets-
Alexandria/06-16-09 WEBAlexandria Writ-Merit Docket.pdf. As this article went to
print, the Virginia Court of Appeals upheld the registration of the North Carolina orders.
Prashad v. Copeland, 2009 Va. App. LEXIS 525 (Va. App. Nov. 24, 2009).
256. A.K. v. N.B., No. 2070086, 2008 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 316 (Ala. Civ. App. May
23, 2008). For a discussion of California's Elisa B. doctrine, see supra Part .B. 1.
257. AK v NB., 2008 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 316, at *6-7.
258. Jd. at *14-16.
259. Brief of Petitioner at 42-45, 51-59, N.B. v. A.K, No. 1080440 (Ala. Apr. 1, 2009)
(on file with author).
260. See, GLAD, supra note 57. For analysis of the interplay between state "defense of
marriage" acts and interstate recognition of a marital parentage presumption deriving from a
same-sex marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership, see Deborah L. Forman, Interstate
Recognition of Same-Sex Parents in the Wake of GayMarriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic
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Parentage without court order by operation of a gender-neutral and marital
status-neutral insemination statute is too new to have generated any dispute
about interstate recognition. The first such law, in the District of Columbia,
went into effect in July 2009. But such parentage does not derive from the
couple's status with respect to each other, and therefore another state's
"defense of marriage" act is not implicated. Because the parental status derives
from a statute, however, it is still not entitled to the same full faith and credit
accorded judgments, and it may be attacked on public policy grounds.
There are solid policy and constitutional arguments why a state should
recognize the parent-child relationship such a statute creates. Although this
article does not develop these in detail, the constitutional arguments begin with
the Substantive Due Process rights inherent in parental status. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly protected those rights against infringement by the state.
261
A biological tie to a child is neither a necessary nor a sufficient determinant of
262who is a parent. A state defines parentage by statute. Once parentage
attaches, the accompanying constitutional rights also attach. If a different state
refuses to recognize the nonbiological mother's parentage, it is, in effect,
terminating her parental rights. That course of action is constitutionally
263impermissible without numerous substantive and procedural safeguards.
Furthermore, a litigant seeking to maintain a parent-child relationship
deriving from an assisted reproduction statute should be able to argue that
recognizing such a relationship only when the biological mother is married to
the other parent is unconstitutional discrimination against children born outside
marriage 26 and that recognizing such a relationship only when the biological
mother's partner is male is unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of
265gender.
Even if litigation ultimately sustains the parent-child relationship created
by presumption or by an assisted conception statute, protracted court cases are
always unwelcome. That is why lawyers advise that a couple obtain a judgment
entitled to full faith and credit. An overwhelming amount of authority backs the
Partnerships, 46 B.C. L. REv. 1 (2004).
261. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion) (calling "the
interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children ... perhaps the oldest of
the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court").
262. It was not necessary in Michael H. v. Gerald D., where the mother's husband,
who was not the child's biological parent, was recognized as the child's legal parent. 491
U.S. 110, 124 (1989). It was not sufficient for the child's biological father in the same case.
Id. at 126-27.
263. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
264. See supra text accompanying notes 25-33. Such a distinction between marital and
nonmarital children is what NCCUSL rejected in its 2002 amendments to the Uniform
Parentage Act. See supra text accompanying notes 138-41.
265. For a constitutional critique of the argument that children must be raised by
parents of different genders, see Carlos A. Ball, Lesbian and Gay Families: Gender
Nonconformity and the Implications ofDifference, 31 CAP. U. L. REv. 691, 724-47 (2003).
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universal validity of parentage created through adoption, which makes that
process the gold standard for unassailable parental status between a
266nonbiological mother and her child. Court orders of parentage should be
equally unassailable, although they have been tested in fewer circumstances
267and have not yet been the subject of extensive scholarly attention.
A New York court recently acknowledged the appropriateness of
exercising an abundance of caution. In In re Sebastian, the New York
Surrogate's Court granted a second-parent adoption to the partner who did not
give birth to the child even though there were two bases for determining that
she was already the child's parent. 268 The couple had married in the
Netherlands (one was a Dutch citizen), thus creating the presumption that the
birth mother's spouse was the child's parent. In addition, the partner's egg was
used and fertilized in vitro with anonymous donor semen, with the resulting
fertilized egg then being implanted in the birth mother.
The court reasoned that this genetic connection to the child also entitled the
partner to be considered the child's parent. The court determined, however, that
other states would accord full faith and credit only to a court order of parentage
or an adoption decree. Because the Surrogate's Court did not have jurisdiction
to grant a parentage decree, a power vested only in the state's Family Court, the
judge issued the requested adoption. The opinion notes that "although ... an
adoption should be unnecessary because Sebastian was born to parents whose
marriage is legally recognized in this state, the best interests of this child
require a judgment that will ensure recognition of both [women] as his legal
parents throughout the entire United States."
' 269
CONCLUSION
The third generation of lesbian mother family law issues is in its infancy.
The vast majority of states ban recognition of same-sex marriage or its
functional equivalent, most by constitutional amendment. In those states there
is no prospect of a parentage presumption deriving from a couple's legal status.
Those same states, however, will be called upon to recognize parental status
established by such presumptions elsewhere.
Enactment of a gender-neutral, marital status-neutral statute governing
conception through donor insemination, along the lines of the Model ABA Act,
is a plausible strategy to protect lesbian couples and their children. It comes
266. See Joslin, Interstate Recognition, supra note 55, at 589 ("Case law, legal
scholarship, and relevant treatises overwhelmingly reach [the conclusion that] adoptions by
lesbian and gay people must be respected by sister states, regardless of whether the adoption
violates the public policy of the forum."). For additional authorities, see supra note 240.
267. Joslin, Interstate Recognition, supra note 55, at 563-600.
268. In reAdoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2009).
269. Id. at 692-93.
Oct. 2009]
266 STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS& CIVIL LIBERTIES [V: 2
with the imprimatur of the American Bar Association. It addresses the situation
that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 2002
did not explicitly address, but which that body has since recognized in the
context of wills and intestate succession under the Uniform Probate Code.
Such a statute furthers economic and emotional security for children. The
parent-child relationship derives from consent to a woman's insemination,
without regard to the marital status or gender of the parents. This avoids the
potential for simultaneous invalidation of the couple's relationship and the
parent-child relationship by a state with a "defense of marriage" act.
In March 1998, a decade after Katie Love-Cooksey's birth to Susan Love
and Helen Cooksey, 27 Nicolaj Caracappa was born to New Jersey couple Eva
Kadray and Camille Caracappa.271 Like Susan and Helen, Eva and Camille
used donor insemination to conceive. Eva gave birth to Nic, who was given
Camille's last name and baptized in Camille's Catholic faith. Eva became a
272
stay-at-home mom while Camille continued working as an oncology nurse.
The couple wanted a second child. They consulted a lawyer about completing a
second-parent adoption of Nic by Camille, but they decided to wait until their
second child was born and to do both together.2 73 They never had that chance.
When Nic was two years old, Camille left for work one day and never came
274home. She suffered a brain aneurysm and was dead by nightfall. She was 38
years old.
Eva applied for child Social Security survivors' benefits for Nic. Those
benefits-many thousands of dollars a year-are designed to compensate a
child for the economic loss of a parent. The benefits were denied because
275Camille had not been Nic's legal parent. If New Jersey had enacted a gender-
neutral, marital status-neutral donor insemination statute, the result would have
been different. Nic's emotional catastrophe-the loss of a parent-would not
have been exacerbated by economic catastrophe-the loss of all the family's
income.
270. See supra pp. 203-05, 207.
271. Maria Newman, Survivor in Gay Union Appeals Denial of Benefits to Boy, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 15, 2003, atB1.
272. Id.
273. Deb Price, Kids in Same-Sex Marriages Need Help, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 27,
2003, at 9A. A separate adoption proceeding for each child would have cost the couple twice
as much as a single proceeding for both children.
274. Id.
275. The ACLU LGBT Project was involved in the litigation. See ACLU Urges Social
Security Administration to Grant Survivor Benefits to Son of Lesbian (Oct. 15, 2003),
http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/relationships/12362prs2OO3l015.html. Nic would have prevailed if
New Jersey law considered him able to inherit as a child from Camille if she died without a
will. The ACLU was unsuccessful in arguing that New Jersey would recognize Camille's
"equitable adoption" of Nic. Professor Courtney Joslin discusses the decision of the
administrative law judge in the case in Joslin, Assisted Reproductive Technology, supra note
132, at 50-51.
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In public discussion about this case, the ACLU LGBT Project attributed
Nic's exclusion from benefits to the inability of Eva and Camille to marry or
otherwise obtain formal relationship recognition. 276 Elsewhere I have criticized
marriage equality advocates who argue that same-sex couples must be allowed
to marry for the sake of their children.277 Since the family law revolution that
began in the late 1960s, children are not supposed to suffer because their
parents have not married, and that principle must extend to the children of
lesbian couples. A gender-neutral and marital-status neutral statute, conferring
parentage on a person who consents to a woman's insemination with the intent
to jointly parent, achieves this result.
Indeed, lesbian couples and their children are better protected by such a
statute than they are by a presumption deriving from the couple's marriage or
civil union/domestic partnership. The latter can be rebutted; the former cannot.
Nic was the son of both Eva and Camille regardless of whether the couple
would have married or entered a civil union had those options been available.
That is what the law must recognize.
Since the first generation of lesbian mother family law issues more than
thirty years ago, advocates have been fighting to keep the focus on the children.
Courts and legislatures that have approved second-parent adoptions have done
just that. Even where available, however, recognition of a child's family should
not depend upon the family's access to court proceedings that require a lawyer
and take two precious and limited commodities-time and money. The
nonbiological mother and her child also should not be legal strangers during the
inevitable period of time it takes to obtain an adoption decree. I look forward to
the day when a mother asks me why she has to adopt her own child, and I can
tell her that she doesn't. That day has come-albeit with a caveat278--in the
District of Columbia.
276. ACLU, supra note 275 ("If the couple had been allowed to marry, Nicolaj would
be entitled to Camille's benefit.... This case illustrates just one of the many ways in which
same-sex couples are hurt by our government's refusal to respect their relationships.").
ACLU attorney Ken Choe stated that "If lesbian and gay couples were allowed to marry, all
of these hoops and obscure legal arguments would be unnecessary." Price, supra note 273.
Columnist Deb Price concludes that, "Ultimately, the only fair way to nurture gay couples
and their children is to open up civil marriage." Id. ACLU attorney Ken Choe further
connected the issue in this case to marriage by commenting that "At times of need, like
death, that's where marriage acts as a safety net for families." Newman, supra note 271.
277. See Nancy D. Polikoff, For the Sake ofAll Children: Opponents and Supporters
of Same-Sex Marriage Both Mss the Mark 8 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 573 (2005). See also
POLIKOFF, BEYOND MARRIAGE, supra note 103, at 100-03.
278. Given the uncertainty surrounding interstate recognition of parentage in the
absence of a court order, I still advise that mother to consult a lawyer and obtain such a court
order, either of parentage or adoption. See supra Part V.
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